On October 10, Treasury announced interim regulations to implement certain provisions of the Foreign Investment Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), which President Trump signed into law on August 13, 2018.

As part of that announcement, Treasury will initiate a pilot program imposing mandatory declarations on transactions involving certain sensitive sectors. That pilot program is due to go into effect on November 10, 2018 and will cover 27 “pilot program industries.” One of the questions for analysis that has emerged is to what extent those sectors intersect with Made in China 2025 priority industries.

Click here to continue reading the full version of this alert.

 

 

The 116th Congress begins on January 3, 2019. Based on projections from yesterday’s midterms, Democrats will control the House of Representatives by a narrow margin, while Republicans will expand their hold on the Senate. The changes to Congress are likely to shape trade policy through 2019, but much will depend on how House Democrats use their new majority, and whether trade is a priority issue or whether it will be overtaken by domestic issues.

Companies will have to carefully navigate the new political environment in order to advance their policy objectives. In addition to accounting for the hard-nosed approach to trade taken by the current administration, an effective policy engagement strategy will have to account for the new political dynamics created by newly empowered House Democrats and a potentially polarized Congress. Companies should be prepared to intervene on issues that are likely to come up in 2019, including: ratification of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA); trade negotiations with the EU, Japan, and the UK; and the ongoing U.S. tariff interventions on China and for sensitive sectors.

Below is our best forecast for the makeup of the trade- and foreign affairs-related committees for the 116th Congress, and their voting record on key pieces of trade legislation:

 

NAFTA
(1994)

China PNTR
(2000)

U.S.-Colombia FTA  (2012)

Korea-U.S.-FTA (2012)

TPA**
(2015)

House Ways and Means
Chair: Richard Neal (D-Massachusetts)

Nay

Yea

Nay

Yea

Nay

Ranking Member: Kevin Brady (R-Texas)

N/A

Yea

Yea

Yea

Yea

House Foreign Affairs
Chair: Eliot Engel (D-New York)

Nay

Nay

Yea

Nay

Nay

Ranking Member: Michael McCaul (R-Texas) OR

N/A

N/A

Yea

Yea

Yea

Joe Wilson (R-South Carolina)

N/A

N/A

Yea

Nay

Yea

Senate Finance
Chair: Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) OR

Yea

Yea

Yea

Yea

Yea

Mike Crapo (R-Idaho)

Nay (as House member)

Yea

Yea

Yea

Yea

Ranking Member: Ron Wyden (D-Oregon)

Yea

Yea

Yea

Yea

Yea

Senate Foreign Relations
Chair: Jim Risch (R-Idaho)

N/A

N/A

Yea

Yea

Yea

Ranking Member: Bob Menendez (D-New Jersey)

Nay

Nay

Nay

Yea

Nay

* China Permanent Normal Trade Relations
** Trade Promotion Authority

We expect the following impacts on 2019 U.S. trade priorities:

Impact on U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA)

The new USMCA is expected to be signed at the end of this month. USMCA would have likely passed in a Republican-held Congress on a bumpy but ultimately consistent trajectory. It will still likely enjoy broad backing in the Republican Senate. With Democrats now in control the House, there may be some new challenges to ratification.

Some of the new provisions in USMCA give cover for Democratic support—including the new wage-based rule of origin for autos and new enforceable labor rules, along with the weakening of investor-state dispute settlement. The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN), which includes the leaders of United Steelworkers and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, last week expressed unanimous support for the agreement. But these changes still might not be enough to gain wide Democratic support. The Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (LAC) noted several reservations on the agreement. Major environmental groups are also already preparing for a major advocacy campaign against USMCA. We expect House Democrats to seek additional concessions from the administration, particularly on the enforceability of the new labor provisions, on the environment, or possibly in the area of intellectual property protections.

If USMCA is signed on November 30, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) would have to publish a study on its probable economic impacts by March 15, 2019, according to Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) procedures. The agreement could theoretically be voted on at any point after publication of the report, but difficulties in assembling the needed votes for implementing legislation would likely delay the process. The Trump Administration may still attempt to withdraw from the existing NAFTA as a tactic to force Congress to pass USMCA. It remains unclear how House Democrats or Senate Republicans would react to such a threat. The role of the business community will be key. The White House would look to U.S. business, including agribusiness, to generate bipartisan support for the agreement.

Impact on Future U.S. FTAs: U.S.-Japan, U.S.-EU, U.S.-UK

The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) notified Congress on October 16 of its intention to begin negotiations for trade agreements with Japan, the EU, and the UK. The earliest that formal negotiations for the Japan and EU agreements could start is January 14, while negotiations with the UK would have to wait until after Brexit on March 29. USTR’s negotiating objectives for these agreements could be published in December or later.

For the new Congress, the Republican majority in the Senate and Democratic majority in the House will have differing sets of concerns for the new negotiations. Senate Republicans will seek many of the outcomes they sought in the NAFTA renegotiation. The Democratic House leadership is likely to call for new measures on labor and the environment, intellectual property, and/or dispute settlement. Some of these, such as opposition to investor-state dispute statement, would resonate with USTR Lighthizer and the White House, though it’s not clear how far the administration would move in the Democrats’ direction on labor or environmental issues. Consideration of the USMCA will be an early test on issues of concern to Democrats that will have implications for other agreements.

USTR is seeking short-term delivery of less controversial outcomes on regulatory alignment and other limited market access issues (such as an enlarged quota for high-quality beef and sales of U.S. soybeans) as part of an early harvest for negotiations with the EU, while with Japan the immediate priorities appear to be focused on market access for autos and agriculture.  Such priorities are not likely to require Congressional ratification and so will be less affected by the changes in Congress.

Impact on Section 301 tariffs

President Trump is expected to meet with President Xi at the G20 Summit in Argentina on November 30- December 1. While the White House has downplayed expectations for the meeting, others see the possibility of beginning a meaningful U.S.-China dialogue and perhaps moderating or delaying additional tariff actions. If no accommodation or way forward is reached, the U.S. has indicated it will increase existing tariffs on certain goods from 10 percent to 25 percent in January, with some reports that the U.S. could also impose new tariffs on nearly all remaining Chinese imports. China would likely respond in kind to any new tariffs.

The new Congress is not likely to change the direction of the U.S. economic relationship with China, although the plight of U.S. farmers facing their worst economic year in a long time might have some effect in pushing individual Members of Congress to seek a moderate course. We expect Republicans in the Senate will continue to have concerns on the impacts of China’s retaliation on the broader economy, but still be reluctant to contradict the administration’s approach. The Democratic-controlled House may be more enthusiastic in supporting tariffs overall and could give the Trump Administration cover to take a harder line if circumstances warrant, although may push back where there are specific constituent impacts. In fact, if the Trump Administration reaches a deal with China at the end of November (or anytime afterward), incoming House Democrats could use their newfound leverage to criticize the administration’s efforts and seek to outflank the administration on China issues. China policy is certain to figure in both parties’ presidential election campaigns as the 2020 presidential election begins to take shape during 2019.

While the current approach broadly to China is likely to continue, there may be enough bipartisan support for the new Congress to continue pushing the administration for a product-exclusion process for the 10 percent tranche of tariffs announced last September.

Impact on Section 232 tariffs

The Trump Administration has implemented tariffs on all imports of steel and aluminum, subject to certain country-specific exceptions. Negotiations for some country-specific exclusions could continue through 2019 (e.g., for Canada, Mexico, Japan, or the EU). In addition, the Trump Administration is considering implementation of tariffs on imports of autos and auto parts.

Changes to the control of Congress are not likely to affect the ongoing Section 232 tariffs related to steel and aluminum. House Democrats and Senate Republicans are likely to take positions on the Section 232 tariffs based on the economic impact for their district or state. Members from steel-heavy districts and states will continue to be supportive of the tariffs, while those from districts and states suffering from negative economic consequences because of retaliation or increased downstream costs are more likely to oppose.

Unless the Trump Administration imposes additional tariffs, we would not expect the new Congress to pass legislation designed to restrict the president’s Section 232 authority, as introduced by Senator Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) in the Senate and Representative Mike Gallagher (R-Wisconsin) in the House earlier this summer. That legislation did not have the votes to pass at the time, and the new Democratic majority in the House is not likely to increase the chances of passage.

In the area of the administration’s potential imposition Section 232 tariffs on autos and auto parts, the economic consequences of the tariffs and any resultant retaliation from other countries are likely to be broad. We would continue to expect a significant degree of bipartisan Congressional opposition to new Section 232 tariffs on autos.

Interaction between International Trade and Domestic Issues

Domestic factors are likely to dominate in shaping international trade and economic policy over the course of the new Congress and the remainder of President Trump’s term. Emerging issues, including renewed interest in comprehensive U.S. federal privacy legislation, could influence future U.S. trade-related rules (e.g., on cross-border data flows) as well as set policy models that other governments could replicate.

While the Trump Administration may be keen to pivot to international issues given its lack of a Congressional majority at home, its ability to negotiate and conclude agreements on multiple fronts could be complicated as it seeks to manage an increased array of investigations and oversight by the Congress. Add to this the inevitable turnover of Cabinet members and White House and Executive Branch staff changes that will occur after the mid-terms, and the administration may see a temporary hiatus in undertaking new policy initiatives, including on trade.

Furthermore, the upcoming presidential campaign could set the stage for an intra-party debate among Democrats on whether to take an even more hawkish approach on trade issues than the current administration; stay the current course; or return to a more centrist policy as was ultimately adopted by the Obama Administration while in office.

On November 5, 2018, in accordance with President Trump’s May 8, 2018 decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an amendment to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR). The amendment followed on the expiration of the final 180-day wind-down period for transactions previously authorized by “General License H” and for the re-imposition of the remaining “secondary sanctions,” which concluded November 4, 2018, at 11:59 PM.

This action, along with the August 6, 2018 issuance of a new Executive Order (E.O. 13846), reinstates a full U.S. embargo against Iran, and fully re-imposes all U.S. sanctions which had been suspended or waived since the implementation of the JCPOA in January 2016.

Below, we summarize OFAC’s action, as well as related actions taken by the State Department to authorize certain waivers of these sanctions. OFAC:

  1. Amended the ITSR to revise 31 C.F.R. § 560.211(c) to implement the authority granted in E.O. 13846 to block all interests in property in the United States, or under the control of a U.S. Person, of a person that has been designated for having either –
    1. Materially assisted or provided support to the Government of Iran in the purchase or acquisition of U.S. currency or precious metals on or after August 7, 2018.
    2. Materially assisted or provided support to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), or the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) on or after November 5, 2018.
  2. Removed the EO 13599 non-SDN List (denoting blocked persons that meet the definition of “Government of Iran” and “Iranian financial institution”) and relisted more than 700 individuals and entities, including Bank Melli, National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), and hundreds of others, on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List).
  3. Amended the existing general license provided in 31 C.F.R. § 560.543 related to the sale of real property in Iran to further authorize U.S. persons to engage in all transactions necessary and ordinarily incident to the sale of personal property in Iran and to transfer the proceeds to the United States, provided that the property was either acquired before the individual became a U.S. Person, or was inherited from persons in Iran.

In parallel, OFAC also issued a number of frequently asked questions (FAQs), which generally provide guidance regarding how OFAC will interpret its Iran-related authorities going forward. This includes, in addition to other things, the following notes:

  • General Summary: The provision of goods or services, or extension of debt or credit, to an Iranian counterparty after November 4, 2018, even pursuant to contracts that were lawful and in effect prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA (May 8, 2018) may result in the imposition of sanctions unless otherwise authorized by OFAC. (FAQ 630)
  • Non-U.S. Persons Receiving Payment for pre-Nov. 5 Activity: However, non-U.S., non-Iranian persons may receive payment for goods or services fully provided or delivered prior to the expiration of the relevant wind-down period and pursuant to contracts in effect prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA (May 8, 2018) after November 5, 2018. (FAQs 631, 634)
  • U.S. Persons Receiving Payment for pre-Nov. 5 Activity: In contrast, U.S. persons, and non-U.S. entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons, will require prior authorization from OFAC to receive payment on or after November 5, 2018 for goods or services fully provided or delivered prior to the expiration of the relevant wind-down period and pursuant to contracts in effect prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018. (FAQ 635)
  • U.S. Persons and New SDNs: U.S. persons, and non-U.S. entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons, require prior authorization from OFAC to receive any payment involving any of the re-listed SDNs from the former EO 13599 List. (FAQ 636)
  • Insurance: OFAC clarified that non-U.S. insurers, reinsurers, and brokers could face U.S. “secondary” sanctions for processing claims after November 5, 2018, even if those claims relate to “incidents” that occurred prior to November 5, 2018 and during a period in which the underlying activity and insurance policy were not prohibited.

In addition to OFAC’s actions, the State Department issued guidance on two sets of waivers that it has issued for sanctions under its authority. Specifically:

  • Significant Reduction Exemption for Crude Oil Importers: The State Department noted that it was granting a “significant reduction exemption” to China, India, Italy, Greece, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. As a result, these countries and importers in these countries will not face “secondary” sanctions risk for importation of Iranian crude oil. The State Department specifically noted that it continues to negotiate with these countries to “get all the nations to zero [oil imports].”
  • Civil Nuclear Energy Waivers: Second, the State Department stated that it will not impose “secondary” sanctions related to ongoing nonproliferation projects at Arak, Bushehr, and Fordow as an “interim measure that preserves oversight of Iran’s civil nuclear program.” These waivers do not, however, extend to any “new civil nuclear projects.” The State Department specifically noted that these waivers are conditional upon “the cooperation of the various stakeholders” and can be rescinded at any time.

These amendments represent the final step in re-imposing the full suite of U.S. primary and secondary sanctions after President Trump’s May 8, 2018 decision to fully withdraw from the JCPOA, returning the U.S. sanctions program to its pre-JCPOA state.

U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons that are owned or controlled by U.S. persons are now prohibited from conducting virtually all Iran-related activity without a license.

Non-U.S. persons face renewed “secondary” sanctions risks for conducting certain types of transactions with sanctioned persons (e.g., Iranian persons on the SDN list) and Iranian industries (e.g., petroleum, petrochemicals, energy, shipping, shipbuilding, precious metals, etc.).

Despite widespread global opposition to these developments—including the passage of updated “Blocking” legislation in the European Union—we expect the Administration to aggressively enforce these new authorities to increase the perceived pressure on Iran, both through expanded enforcement of “primary” sanctions (e.g., aggressive investigation and imposition of penalties with respect to perceived violations) and through increased numbers of “secondary” sanctions designations.

 

 

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) previously announced a process to obtain product exclusions from the additional tariffs in effect on certain products imported from China under the U.S. response to China’s unfair trade practices related to the forced transfer of U.S. technology and intellectual property. The 301 lists of products subject to tariffs was determined by a 90-day process that included public hearings and a notice and comment period. You can also find an unofficial spreadsheet with the final 301 lists here.

The USTR also provided an opportunity for the public to request the exclusion of a particular product from the additional duties in order to address situations that warranted excluding a particular product within a subheading, but not the tariff subheading as a whole.

All posted exclusion requests can be found on: https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USTR-2018-0025.

The USTR recently announced that it is still in the process of posting exclusion requests due to the high volume of submissions, and therefore there is currently a lag between the filing of an exclusion request and the posting of an exclusion request when public and confidential versions are been filed. The date of posting is the triggering date for initial comments regarding an exclusion requests.  Permissible comments include letters of support as well as opposition.  After the comment period is closed, an additional deadline will be established for rebuttal comments.

As of the date of this report, 815 exclusion requests have been denied.

None have been granted.

We hope you find this report helpful and please contact us if you have any questions.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Webinar – November 8, 2018

Starts: 1:00 PM (EDT)
Ends: 2:00 PM (EDT)

3D printing is a leading technology that transforms how and where goods are designed, made (printed), distributed, and sold.  Government agencies, including the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, have engaged in initiatives to promote innovation related to 3D printing.  As companies gain efficiencies through transitioning to 3D printing, and government encourages its use, government contractors should be alert to the myriad of compliance considerations involved in selling 3D printed parts pursuant to public contracts.

Join the Crowell & Moring team on Thursday, November 8th at 1:00 pm EDT to discuss strategies for transitioning the manufacture of goods for sale to the government to an additive, 3D printing process.  Our team of experienced practitioners and consultants will walk through a range of compliance considerations – from supplier and material approval requirements to inspection and cybersecurity considerations – to arm you with the knowledge you need to implement this forward-looking technology while maintaining compliance with rigorous government regulations.

We hope you will join us for the free webinar.

Speakers

  • Gail Zirkelbach, Partner
  • Mana Lombardo, Counsel
  • Michael Gruden, Associate

 

Contact: Kim Peters (202.508.8991, kpeters@crowell.com)
Register

Last updated on 10/30/2018: Added South Africa’s Section 232 steel and aluminum exemptions.

Unofficial spreadsheet with Final 301 list, partial list, and HTS’ removed added.

U.S. Trade Actions

Action Covered Products Rate Increase Effective Date
Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Steel – 25%
Aluminum – 10%
6/1/2018
Status: Steel – all countries of origin except South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina (agreed to quotas); and Australia (exempted).

Aluminum – all countries of origin except Argentina (agreed to quota); and Australia (exempted).

Beginning August 13, steel articles covered by Section 232 from Turkey are subject to an ad valorem duty rate of 50%.

On October 24, South Africa was granted exemptions on 161 aluminum and 36 steel products by the Commerce Department.

Section 232 Autos and Automotive Parts TBD TBD
Status: For the latest status, please click here.
Section 301 For the final list of products in List 1, please click here.

For the final list of products in List 2, please click here.

For the final list of products in List 3, please click here.

25%

 

25%

 

10%

25%

7/6/2018

 

8/23/2018

 

9/24/2018

1/1/2019

Status: List 1 totaling $34 billion worth of imports is composed of 818 tariff lines, and went into effect on 7/6/2018.

List 2 totaling $16 billion worth of imports was originally composed of 284 proposed tariff lines identified by the interagency Section 301 Committee. 279 of the 284 lines went into effect on 8/23/2018.

For full details on List 2, please click here.

List 3 totaling approximately $200 billion of imports was originally composed of 6,031 tariff lines. 5,745 full and partial lines go into effect on 9/24/2018.

For full details on List 3, please click here.

Unofficial searchable and filterable spreadsheet with Current U.S. Section 301 Tariff Lists (Updated for Final List 3)

Retaliatory Actions

 

Canada For covered products, please click here. Table 1 – 25%
Table 2 – 10%
Table 3 – 10%
7/1/2018
Status: The Canadian government received over 1,000 submissions of public feedback during public consultations on its original list.

Canada is imposing countermeasures against C$16.6 billion in imports of steel, aluminum, and other products from the U.S., representing the value of 2017 Canadian exports affected by the U.S. tariffs.

EU For covered products, please click here. Annex I – 10% or 25%
Annex II – 10% – 50%
Annex I – 6/22/2018
Annex II – 3/23/2018 or 5th day after WTO Dispute Settlement Body rules against the U.S. action, whichever is first.
Status: For the latest status, please click here.
Mexico For the translated list of covered products, please click here. 7% – 25% (pages 1-4)

 

10% – 15% (page 5)

6/5/2018

7/5/2018

Status: Most retaliatory measures effective as of 6/5/2018. An “exception” list is effective on 7/5/2018.
China (Response to Section 232 Tariffs) For covered products, please click here. Annex I – 15% – 25% 4/3/2018
Status: See above.
China (Response to Section 301 Tariffs) For covered products in List 1, please click here.

(Unofficial Version)

25% 7/6/2018
For covered products in List 2, please click here.(Unofficial Version) 25% 8/23/2018
For covered products in List 3 (announced August 3), please click here.(Unofficial Version) Annex 1 and 2 – now 10%

Annex 3 – now 5%

Annex 4 – remains 5%

(Originally 1-3 were 25, 20, and 10 percent, respectively)

9/24/2018
Status: List 1 is composed of 545 tariff lines, and goes into effect on 7/6/2018.

List 2 contains 333 tariff lines on U.S. goods worth $16 billion. Start date is 8/23/2018.

List 3 contains 5,207 tariff lines on U.S. worth $60 billion. Start date is 9/24/2018.

India For covered products, please click here. Up to $10.6 billion;
Annex I – 5% – 100%
6/21/2018
Status: The U.S. declined India’s request for WTO consultations. Thus leading to India’s retaliation tariffs on U.S. goods, effective immediately.
Japan For covered products, please click here. Up to $1.91 billion TBD – no earlier than March 23, 2021, or the 5th day following the date of a decision from the WTO DSB, whichever comes first.
Status: No update since May 18, 2018. Ambassador Lighthizer is holding trade talks with Economy Minister Motegi in July. Under Secretary McKinney is also leading a trade mission to Japan to discuss a possible bilateral trade deal.
Russia For covered products, please click here. Up to $3.16 billion TBD
Status: Russia will apply the proposed suspension of equivalent concessions upon the expiration of 30 days from the day on which Council on Trade in Goods has been notified. The suspension will continue until the U.S. lifts the safeguard measures.
Turkey For covered products, please click here. Up to $1.78 billion;
Annex I – 5% – 40%
6/21/2018
Status:

Update on 10/15/2018: certain HTSUS subheadings covered by the supplemental action were modified as of October 1, 2018. This notice conforms the September 21 supplemental action to the HTSUS modifications in the Presidential Proclamation and amends the prior action taken in the investigation by removing certain subheadings of the HTSUS listed in Annex A to the September 21st Notice. 83 FR 49153.

Update on 8/22/2018: added the Government of Turkey’s WTO response to the U.S.’ doubling of tariffs on steel articles covered by Section 232 imported from Turkey.

Update on 8/16/2018: added link to Federal Register Notice formalizing China List 2 Section 301 tariffs.

Update on 8/14/2018: added new Section 232 tariff of 50% on steel from Turkey.

Update on 8/8/2018: added China’s retaliatory tariffs on $16 billion – List of affected HTS Subheadings includes additional 219 tariff items, plus tariff rate of 25%.

Update on 8/7/2017: added USTR’s final list of covered products for Section 301 List 2 tariffs with 25% tariff rate.

Update on 8/3/18: added China’s latest Section 301 (List 3) retaliatory tariffs.

Update on 8/2/2018: changed the proposed rate for China Section 301 List 3 from 10 percent to 25 percent.

Update on 7/13/2018: added link to an unofficial searchable and filterable spreadsheet listing the tariff codes for all three current U.S. Section 301 tariff lists (see last line in Section 301 Status).

Update on 7/11/2018: added new U.S. Section 301 tariffs announced on 7/10/2018.

Update on 7/2/2018: added EU Annex I tariffs effective.

Update on 6/29/2018: added Canadian retaliatory tariffs.

Update on 6/21/2018: added India, Japan, Russia, and Turkey.

Update on 6/18/2018: added China’s Section 301 retaliatory tariffs.

Update on 6/15/2018: added new U.S. Section 301 tariffs; added translated version of Mexican retaliatory measures and updated Mexico section.

Update on 9/18/2018: added the final list of products in List 3, its tariff rate of 10 percent, effective date of 9/24/2018, and tariff rate of 25 percent effective on 1/1/2019. Also, China’s retaliatory action for the new tariffs has been updated. The tariff rates changed for three of the four annexes. The new tariffs are effective on 9/24/2018.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Crowell & Moring LLP is pleased to announce that Mariana Pendás, in the firm’s International Trade Group, has been recognized by Latinvex as one of Latin America’s “Rising Legal Stars.” The list honors 50 lawyers from 38 international law firms doing business in Latin America. Selections were made based on scope and prominence of work and future potential.

Pendás, a dual-qualified lawyer in Spain and New York, and admitted to practice in Brussels under the E-list, focuses her practice on compliance with U.S. and EU economic sanctions, anti-money laundering laws and regulations, export controls, anti-corruption/anti-bribery laws and regulations, international arbitration, and dispute resolution. Latinvex highlighted her experience assisting U.S. clients on U.S. sanctions relating to different programs such as U.S. Venezuela-related sanctions and counter narcotics trafficking sanctions.

About Crowell & Moring’s Latin American Practice

Crowell & Moring represents clients in Latin America and the Caribbean on issues including international arbitration, corporate, finance, international trade, and policy issues. The firm regularly advises clients on issues under international and regional trade conventions, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Central America-Dominican Republic-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), as well as bilateral free trade agreements between the United States and Colombia, Panama, and other countries. The firm also advises on anti-money laundering and sanctions issues across Latin America.

Latinvex publishes daily news and weekly analysis on Latin America business; its coverage extends to the region’s legal sector, including rankings of law firms and individual lawyers. (No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Bars of, or any courts in, the jurisdictions in which the lawyers are admitted to practice).

 

Washington – Crowell & Moring International (CMI) LLC is pleased to announce that Himamauli “Him” Das, former Senior Director for International Trade and Investment at the National Security Council and National Economic Council, as well as the former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade and Investment at the Treasury Department, has affiliated with the firm as Senior Advisor. With nearly two decades of experience across the White House, the State Department, and the Treasury Department, he will serve as a consultant on trade, investment, and market access issues.

“Him brings substantial government and international experience across the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations working with the international institutions where CMI operates,” said Robert Holleyman, CMI’s president and CEO.

Das was responsible for coordinating White House policy on trade negotiations – including the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – and trade enforcement.  He was also responsible for trade and investment matters in international fora, including the G7, the G20, OECD, the UN, APEC, and ASEAN. At the Treasury Department, Das led negotiations related to financial services and exchange rate matters, developed rules governing the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and played a leadership role on international financial regulatory standards and on bilateral investment treaties.

“Him has been involved with CFIUS matters at all levels of government since 2006, reviewing hundreds of transactions in that time. He understands the rapidly evolving investment and national security landscape,” Holleyman said. “With passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) and new investment standards being considered globally, Him’s counsel will be particularly timely.”

Das said, “I am excited to work together with CMI to support and expand its longstanding capabilities in the areas of trade, investment and multilateral institutions. I am also enthusiastic about advancing the digital transformation initiative at CMI having long been engaged in international efforts focused on cross-border data transfers, fintech, regtech and emerging payment models.

In addition to consulting for CMI, Das serves as Chief Legal Officer and Senior Vice President of the Financial Integrity Network (FIN), a Washington-based advisory firm that provides services to governments, financial services firms, and other organizations to strengthen global financial integrity.

Das earned his J.D., Order of the Coif, M.P.P., and B.A., high distinction, from the University of California, Berkeley, and his M.Sc. from the University of Colorado

 

On October 23, 2018, the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a notice seeking comments on imposing export control restrictions on electronic waste in response to concerns that unregulated recycling of electronic waste is a source of counterfeit goods. BIS has proposed to define electronic waste, prohibit electronic waste export, establish electronic waste exemptions, and require an export license to ship exempted electronic waste abroad. The Bureau is seeking public comment until December 24, 2018 on all aspects of the proposal including the definition, methods of tracking exported electronic waste, costs, and the likely effectiveness of the regulations.

October 25, 2018 • Brussels, Belgium

Starts: 2:30 PM
Ends: 3:50 PM

Location: Radisson Red Hotel, Rue d´Idalie, 35, 1050, Brussels, Belgium

Register

The free flow of data across borders is critical for trade, economic growth and social progress. Governments in APEC and ASEAN have made great strides in creating privacy frameworks which encourage convergence across the region, enabling data to flow while maintaining a similar level of protection for citizens. Yet gaps remain. More needs to be done at both the regional and national levels to support greater alignment of these frameworks, and to work with other regions – including the EU – to facilitate interoperability. With data increasingly fueling growth and innovation in today’s digital economy, the time to get this right is now.

The International Conference of Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners (ICDPPC) is the annual, high-level gathering of international data protection authorities, public officials and private sector representatives that convenes to discuss the future of privacy regulation, data flows, and related issues brought about by technological innovation in the modern digital economy. Registration for the ICDPPC is not required to attend this event, and we invite data protection officers, policy and government affairs professionals, and others with a stake in the global privacy and data protection environment to join this discussion.

Privacy perspectives from the Asia-Pacific will include data protection authorities, industry innovators and trade associations. It will examine recent initiatives and emerging views from the region. The discussion will also delve into the latest efforts to enable seamless global data transfers, including trust marks, certification mechanisms and the APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules. Stakeholders will discuss best practices in this arena, the path forward for policy in the Asia-Pacific, and how APEC, ASEAN and EU officials can lead the way in facilitating global interoperability.

Speakers will include:

  • Ambassador Robert Holleyman, President & CEO, C&M International and former Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
  • Boris Wojtan, Director of Privacy, GSMA
  • Hilary Wandall, GC and Chief Data Governance Officer, TrustArc
  • Huey Tan, President, AsiaDPO
  • Representatives from the Personal Information Protection Commission (PPC) of Japan and the Japan Institute for Promotion of Digital Economy and Community (JIPDEC)

Contact: Clark Jennings (202.624.2652 , cjennings@crowell.com)