Last week, the FAA moved forward with rulemaking on expanded drone operations with the release of several key documents: (1) a Draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems over People, (2) a Draft Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) for Safe and Secure Operations of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, and (3) the announcement of the Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) Pilot Program. This blog post, is the first of two.

The draft rule increases manufacturing and operational obligations based on the risk category, with higher-risk operations being subject to greater operational limitations and responsibilities. The lowest-risk category, light-weight drones, imposes no manufacturing requirements, and drone operations in this category can begin immediately after the final rule goes into effect. Higher-risk categories come with complex design requirements necessitating FAA acceptance, operating limitations, record-keeping requirements, and other obligations. Manufacturers should note that the proposed rule sets desired design outcomes without mandating a specific solution.

The manufacturing requirements for higher-risk operations over people will also apply retroactively to drones currently on the market. Thus, manufacturers of existing drones will need to comply with the proposed design requirements in order to market their drones for operations under the rule. Once the rule takes effect, compliance with and understanding of the design outcome requirements, and the process for FAA acceptance, will be crucial to manufacturers’ ability to market new and existing drones.

The Draft NPRM would allow routine nighttime operations and operations over people under the Small UAS Rule (14 C.F.R. §107) without a waiver or exemption. In a nod to advancing technology, the proposed rule seeks to balance the interests of safety-risk mitigation with rapid industrial innovation.

Current FAA regulations do not permit small drone operations at nighttime or over people. The existing waiver process for such operations can add substantial delays to important commercial operations. The proposed rule will provide significant relief from the cumbersome waiver process for both types of operations, subject to certain design and operational requirements.

Flying at Night and Over People

Under the proposed rule, operators may conduct nighttime operations without obtaining a waiver so long as they complete updated knowledge training and comply with anti-collision lighting requirements as specified in the Draft NPRM. Operators who do not meet these conditions may still request a waiver for nighttime operations using the traditional waiver process.

Operators would also be free to conduct operations over people, subject to important manufacturing and operational constraints. Recognizing that the risk associated with operations over people is higher than the risk of mere nighttime operations, the FAA proposes three categories of permissible operations over people, each keyed to the associated risk of injury.

The Small UAS Rule is Still in Effect

While the Draft NPRM signals an effort by FAA to relax operational restrictions for small, commercial drone operations, it does not change the overall regulatory structure for small drones. Remote pilots should note that the proposed rule does not:

  • Cancel operator requirements to comply with existing provisions of the Small UAS Rule.
  • Alter the enforcement regime currently in place.
  • Change the existing waiver process.

And, notably, the proposed rule applies only to operations conducted under the Small UAS Rule. Therefore, the following categories of operations would remain unaffected:

  • Operations of drones weighing greater than 55 pounds.
  •  Air carriers.
  • Operations under an exemption.
  • Recreational drone operators.

The FAA will not seek or solicit comments until the final NPRM is published in the Federal Register. However, interested parties should consider reviewing the draft now to identify concerns and cause for comment.

The FAA’s movement toward meeting its Congressional mandate to accelerate integration of drones into our national airspace system is encouraging for commercial drone operators. Robust industry participation in the rulemaking process is crucial to creating opportunities in the commercial drone space.

Watch our website for the second of two alerts, addressing the Draft Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the announcement of the UTM Pilot Program, and for updates on deadlines for comments to the Notices.

 

Photo by Dunphasizer on Flickr

On 15 January 2019, Members of Parliament (MP) voted overwhelmingly against the UK Government’s proposed Brexit Withdrawal Agreement, resulting in a ‘historic loss’ for PM Theresa May. Opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn immediately called for a vote of no confidence in the Government which took place on 16 January 2019. The Government won the vote, meaning that at this stage there will be no early general election.

Options

Regarding the rejection of the Withdrawal Agreement, PM May has 3 days to present a plan on how the withdrawal should proceed. There are several options at the moment.

  • The first one is ‘hard Brexit’, which means the UK will leave the EU on 29 March 2019 with no deal in place with the EU.
  • Second, the UK government could propose to re-negotiate another agreement with the EU. At the moment, this scenario seems unlikely as EU27 persistently refuses to negotiate a new deal. If the EU nevertheless agrees, then Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) could possibly be extended, resulting in an additional 2-year period to negotiate a new deal.
  • Third, the UK Government could hold a new referendum on the current Withdrawal Agreement; this scenario also seems unlikely, as the Government has said preparations for a new referendum could not be completed before the March 2019 exit date. Alternatively, PM May could call for an early general election in order to get a political mandate for her deal, but given the current lack of support for the deal and for her government in general this would be a risky strategy and therefore seems equally unlikely. If it were to occur, the UK could ask for an extension of the 2-year period according to Article 50 (3) TEU.
  • Finally, it is worth mentioning that according to the European Court of Justice, the UK could unilaterally revoke its intention to withdraw. However, in the current climate, this scenario seems unlikely as well.

With only 70 days until the mandated exit date arrives, it is clear the UK’s Parliament has much work to do. PM May’s new Brexit plan must be published on 21 January and a full debate and key vote on that plan will take place on 29 January.

No Consensus on Direction

She is looking to hold talks with MPs of all parties, but Mr Corbyn has refused to participate unless PM May rules out leaving the EU with no deal. In response PM May explained it is not within the Government’s power to do so and the UK will leave the EU on 29 March unless Parliament either agrees to a deal with the EU or the UK revokes Article 50 and chooses to stay in the EU permanently, which she believes would be wrong. Discussions with other parties have already taken place, but there is currently no consensus on the direction that any new plan will take.

 

Photo by Vincent Guth on Unsplash;

On October 18, 2018, U.S. Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) and ten other Democratic senators sent a letter to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) asking why an exclusion process was not in place for the 10 percent tariff on List 3’s $200 billion of imported Chinese goods.

On January 11, 2019, USTR replied, telling Senator Kaine an exclusion process will not be initiated on List 3 unless negotiations fail with China and the President raises the tariff on the $200 billion worth of goods from 10 percent to 25 percent. Currently, President Trump has agreed to delay the implementation of the higher tariff until March 2, 2019.

USTR’s reply also addressed Chinese goods admitted into a Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ). The letter said, “Understandably, every importer, including importers who make use of FTZs, would prefer a special exemption from the additional tariffs. As of this time, we have not found a basis for exempting U.S. importers who use FTZs from the additional duties, when those duties apply to all other U.S. importers.”

 

 

 

 

Crowell & Moring has issued its seventh-annual “Litigation Forecast 2019: What Corporate Counsel Need to Know for the Coming Year.”

The story focusing on international trade, “Big Questions For The CIT,” provides a concise summary on how the Trump administration’s aggressive trade policy has dramatically increased the scope and scale of litigation at the Court of International Trade (CIT).

In addition, the Forecast also explores trends in #MeToo litigation, consumer protection, and more, and it provides forward looking insights to help legal departments anticipate and respond to challenges that might arise in the year ahead.

Be sure to follow the conversation on social media with #LitigationForecast.

 

Photo by Vidar Nordli-Mathisen on Unsplash;

Earlier this week, U.S. Customs and Border Protection posted a notice on Section 301 Product Exclusions announced on December 28, 2018.

The notice provided the following guidance regarding exclusions granted by USTR:

  • On December 28, 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative published Federal Register Notice 83 FR 67463 announcing the decision to grant certain exclusion requests from the 25% duty assessed on goods of China with an annual trade value of approximately $34 billion (Tranche 1), as part of the action in the Section 301 investigation of China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. The product exclusions announced in this notice will apply as of the July 6, 2018 effective date of the $34 billion action (see Federal Register 83 FR 28710), and will extend for one year after the publication of this notice.
  • At the conclusion of the government funding hiatus, CBP will issue instructions on entry guidance and implementation.  Any updates to the Automated Customs Environment (ACE) will be implemented 10 business days after the shutdown has concluded. Until these updates are completed, entry and entry summaries must be submitted without the Chapter 99 product exclusion number referenced in 83 FR 67463.  Entry and entry summaries will be rejected by ACE if the Chapter 99 product exclusion number referenced in 83 FR 67463 is transmitted.
  • Once CBP issues guidance and implements ACE enhancements, a Post Summary Correction (PSC) or a Protest may be submitted for a refund.
  • All questions related to Section 301 entry filing requirements should be emailed to traderemedy@cbp.dhs.gov.  After the funding hiatus, questions from the importing community concerning ACE rejections should be referred to their ABI Client Representative.

 

Photo by Allen Allen;

The USTR published a Federal Register Notice announcing its yearly “special review” to identify countries that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) or deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. persons who rely on intellectual property protection under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301).  Based on this review, the USTR will determine whether to identify “Priority Foreign Countries” defined under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974.

Priority Foreign Countries are countries for which the USTR can implement an investigation pursuant to Section 301 to determine whether certain trade measures are appropriate to address a country’s restrictions on trade and intellectual property rights. The most recent investigation under Section 301 occurred in 2017 and 2018 and resulted in the USTR implementing tariffs on approximately $250 billion of imports from China.

The USTR requested that interested parties provide written comments to identify “countries whose acts, policies, or practices deny adequate and effective protection for intellectual property rights or deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. persons who rely on intellectual property protection.” The Special 301 provisions also require the Trade Representative to identify any act, policy, or practice of Canada that affects cultural industries, was adopted or expanded after December 17, 1992, and is actionable under Article 2106 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The USTR requested that interested parties file written comments that identify acts, policies, or practices that may form the basis of a country’s identification as a Priority Foreign Country or placement on the Priority Watch List or Watch List by February 7, 2019. USTR also requests that parties file notices of intent to appear at the public hearing by February 21, 2019. The public hearing will be held on February 27, 2019. Parties who testified at the hearing must submit posthearing written comments by March 5, 2019. The USTR indicated that it will publish the 2019 Special 301 Report on or around April 26, 2016.

On December 28, 2018, USTR published in the Federal Register the first Section 301 List 1 Product Exclusions. The exclusions apply as of the July 6, 2018 effective date of “List 1,” and will extend for one year after the publication of this notice. U.S. Customs and Border Protection will issue instructions on entry guidance and implementation.

Please see our earlier blog post discussing the details of this notice, as it was announced and posted by USTR on December 21, 2018.

 

 

On December 21, 2018 USTR submitted for publication a Federal Register Notice with the first list of products excluded from Section 301 Tariffs on certain products from China. The Products were originally published on the USTR’s “List 1” which included $34 Billion worth of imports from China. The USTR granted 984 individual exclusion requests involving 21 separate HTS codes. An index of all “List 1” exclusion requests and their status in the review process was also released by the USTR.

Once published in the Federal Register, the product exclusions apply as of the July 6, 2018 effective date of “List 1,” and will extend for one year after the publication of this notice. U.S. Customs and Border Protection will issue instructions on entry guidance and implementation.

Exclusions were granted in two ways.

1) Exclusions that apply to the following  8 individual 10  digit HTS codes regardless of product descriptions noted in exclusion requests:

(i) 8412.21.0075

(ii) 8418.69.0120

(iii) 8480.71.8045

(iv) 8482.10.5044

(v) 8482.10.5048

(vi) 8482.10.5052

(vii) 8525.60.1010

2) Products that meet 24 separate product descriptions sourced from language in exclusion requests.

The publication date is currently unknown due to the lapse in government funding and partial government shutdown.

 

On December 20, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality Act (NICA Act). The sanctions listed in the NICA Act are additional and would be complementary to the current sanctions that have already been imposed on Nicaragua by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The NICA Act aims to block any loan that could be issued by international financial institutions that could benefit the current Government of Nicaragua and will only allow international loans once the Department of State determines that the Government of Nicaragua is taking the appropriates steps towards democracy, corruption-free elections and institutions, strengthening the rule of law, respecting the freedom of the press and individuals and entities with opposing views, and combating corruption.

The NICA Act requires U.S. members of the various international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and Inter-American Bank to use their “voice, vote and influence” to oppose the extension of loans and financial or technical assistance for projects related to Nicaragua. The NICA Act complements the current sanctions that were recently issued by the most recent Executive Order (E.O.) 13851, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua”, which gives the President the authority to designate asset-blocking sanctions and visa-rejections to any current or former officials (since 2007) of the Government of Nicaragua or any person acting on behalf of the Nicaraguan Government engaging in human rights abuse or corruption.

These new sanctions are already affecting Nicaragua, even if indirectly. According to published reports in Nicaragua, major U.S. banks including but not limited to Wells Fargo and Bank of America that have operated as correspondent banks for Nicaraguan financial institutions have notified their Nicaraguan correspondent banks that that they will be closing their accounts and ceasing their operations in and with Nicaragua. These banks are reportedly taking these steps as a result of the higher risks recently associated with the country.

These new sanctions imposed by the United States (described below) may lead other businesses to also cease or diminish their commercial relations with Nicaragua. At a minimum, Nicaragua is “high risk” for business transactions.

Executive Order 13851 Announced on November 27, 2018

On November 27, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O) 13851, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua”. The E.O. establishes criteria for blocking property and interests of property that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any U.S. person (including U.S. persons such as foreign branches located outside the United States) of persons determined by OFAC to be responsible for or complicit in—inter alia—serious human rights abuse or corruption in Nicaragua, as well as actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions or that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Nicaragua.

Consistent with other Orders promulgated pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), the new E.O. specifically prohibits:

  1. Receiving and contributing funds, goods, or services by or to benefit any person designated by the E.O.;
  2. Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set in this E.O.Pursuant to this E.O., OFAC added two individuals associated with the Government of Nicaragua to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List:

Pursuant to this E.O., OFAC added two individuals associated with the Government of Nicaragua to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List:

  • Rosario Murillo de Ortega (also known as “La Chayo”) – Vice-President and First Lady of Nicaragua.
  • Nestor Moncada Lau (also known as “Chema”) – National Security Advisor and private Secretary of President Daniel Ortega

Global Magnitsky Sanctions Issued on July 5th, 2018

These recently issued sanctions build upon the previously announced Global Magnitsky Sanctions designations of the following three individuals who were identified for their close relationships to the Nicaraguan regime for human rights abuses and acts of corruption:

  • Francisco Javier Diaz Madriz – Current Acting Director General of the National Police (was a commissioner at the time these sanctions were issued).
  • Fidel Antonio Moreno Briones – Leader of the government-controlled Sandinista Youth.
  • Jose Francisco Lopez Centeno – Vice-President of ALBANISA (51% owned by Venezuela’s state-owned PDVSA), and President of Petronic (Nicaragua’s state-owned oil company).

The E.O. also authorizes future designations of any person that has been an official of the government of Nicaragua since January 10, 2007 and is determined to have engaged or attempted to engage in:

 

  • Serious human rights abuse in Nicaragua;
  • Actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Nicaragua;
  • Actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Nicaragua;
  • Any transaction or series of transactions involving deceptive practices or corruption by, on behalf of, or otherwise related to the Government of Nicaragua, such as the misappropriation of public assets or expropriation of private assets for personal gain or political purposes, corruption related to government contracts, or bribery.

The E.O. defines the term “Government of Nicaragua” as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of Nicaragua, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government of Nicaragua. This definition bears a resemblance to recent sanctions targeting Venezuela – but without the general licenses.

Companies doing business in Nicaragua must exercise caution when engaging in any transactions with any entity that may be owned (50% or more) by any of the newly sanctioned Nicaraguan officials, as the link to these individuals may not be obvious. Consistent with past approaches, it appears that an individual high risk for corruption risk is also high risk for sanctions exposure. Compliance programs for businesses continuing ties to Nicaragua should continue to include robust beneficial ownership due diligence, supply chain transparency, record keeping, and, potentially, audits of counter parties to ensure the same high standards apply throughout the transaction chain.

 

Crowell & Moring will continue to monitor the situation in Nicaragua, including any potential effects of any upcoming sanction(s) or legislation.

Photo by Allen Allen;

On December 3, 2018, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the National Credit Union Administration, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (together “the agencies”), issued a joint statement encouraging banks to test and implement innovative approaches to meeting their Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (BSA/AML) obligations. The agencies hope to harness private sector innovation to better protect the financial system from financial crime and to allow financial institutions to make better use of limited compliance resources. The agencies identify in particular risk identification, transaction monitoring, and suspicious activity reporting as obligations that can benefit from innovation. They also identify internal financial intelligence units, artificial intelligence, and digital identity technologies as innovations that can help advance AML programs.

To foster innovation without fear of criticism, the agencies have laid out policies for how they will interact with banks piloting new technologies.

  • First, while the agencies may provide feedback, banks that pilot innovative technologies should not be subject to supervisory criticism for any failures in such pilot programs.
  • Second, “pilot programs that expose gaps in current BSA/AML compliance programs will not necessarily lead to supervisory action.” For example, “when banks test or implement artificial intelligence-based transaction monitoring systems and identify suspicious activity that would not otherwise have been identified under existing processes, the agencies will not automatically assume that banks’ existing processes are deficient.”
  • Third, the implementation of innovative approaches in banks’ BSA/AML programs “will not result in additional regulatory expectations.”
  • Fourth, FinCEN will consider requests for exceptive relief under 31 C.F.R. § 1010.970 to promote the testing of new technologies, provided that banks maintain the overall effectiveness of their AML programs.

The agencies’ joint statement did make clear, though, that while innovation is critical to continued protection against money laundering and other financial crime actors, it is not an excuse to fail to comply with current BSA/AML requirements. Banks “must continue to meet their BSA/AML compliance obligations, as well as ensure the safety and soundness of the bank, when developing pilot programs and other innovative approaches.” In making such determinations, “bank management should prudently evaluate whether, and at what point, innovative approaches may be considered sufficiently developed to replace or augment existing BSA/AML processes.” Such a decision should also address other factors like third-party risk management, compliance with other applicable laws and regulations, and issues of customer privacy. Banks also are encouraged to engage early with regulators regarding such programs to promote the agencies’ understandings of these programs and as “a means to discuss expectations regarding compliance and risk management.” Each of the agencies has committed to establishing projects or offices to support engagement on the implementation of such innovations.

The joint statement comes against a backdrop of continued increases for many banks in the costs of operating compliant AML programs, and continued enforcement – such as the recent $598 million settlement with federal regulators of alleged AML violations by US Bank — emphasizing the need for greater resourcing of AML programs. This has led many banks to consider innovations that might make compliance more efficient and reduce costs, but also has led Congress to consider other measures, such as changing BSA reporting thresholds. The new statement appears to be an effort by the agencies to resolve this resource tension by favoring innovation. It complements another recent guidance document from the same agencies encouraging smaller banks to share compliance resources where possible.

Practical Considerations

 

A number of new products and services offer real opportunities for banks to improve their transaction monitoring and other AML processes, resulting in stronger programs and reduced cost. However, banks should ensure that pilot projects and other innovations do not compromise their ability to effectively operate their current BSA/AML compliance programs. One way this can happen is migrating from previous methods to new technologies before the latter have been properly tested. For example, money transmitter MoneyGram International recently was required to pay an additional $125 million penalty, and had its deferred prosecution agreement extended, for AML program failures that occurred after it transitioned to a new fraud interdiction system that turned out to be ineffective. Another way this can happen is if the resources needed to administer a pilot project take away from resources needed to operate existing aspects of an AML program. The agencies have made clear that while they will not necessarily subject any failed pilot programs to supervisory criticism, they will continue to scrutinize banks’ current processes for any deficiencies, and expect them to remain compliant while testing new methods.