The Council of the European Union (EU) and the European Parliament have reached a long-awaited political agreement to reform the Union Customs Code (UCC). The European Commission presented the UCC reform proposal in May 2023, and the European Parliament adopted its position at first reading in March 2024. The text has since been pending the Council’s first reading for two years.

The agreed text has not yet been published. However, the following changes are expected:

1. The EU Customs Data Hub

One of the pillars of the reform is the creation of the EU Customs Data Hub, a centralized digital platform that will serve as the sole point of interaction between businesses and customs authorities across the EU. It aims to eliminate the current IT fragmentation across the 27 EU member states. Businesses will submit their customs data to the Data Hub, and that information may cover multiple consignments and be accessible to all relevant national authorities. The rollout will be phased: the EU Customs Data Hub will become operational for e-commerce goods on July 1, 2028, with full expansion covering all movements of goods by March 1, 2034.

2. The EU Customs Authority

Alongside the EU Customs Data Hub, the reform establishes a new decentralized EU agency: the EU Customs Authority. The agency’s headquarters will be in Lille, France.

For the first time, the EU will have a dedicated agency responsible for coordinating and strengthening the Customs Union. The authority’s mandate covers several functions:

  • Oversight of the EU Customs Data Hub, ensuring that the platform operates effectively and that data is used to its full potential.
  • Risk analysis and management, by continuously analyzing import and export data flowing through the hub to identify the highest-risk cargoes entering the EU and prioritize them for inspection.
  • Establishment of priority control areas and risk criteria, giving national customs offices consistent, EU-wide guidance on where to focus enforcement efforts.
  • EU-level crisis management, coordinating responses to customs-related emergencies or disruptions that cross national borders.

The authority will be established on the date the overarching regulation enters into force, ensuring it is ready to begin operations as the new system rolls out in phases.

3. Trust and Check Traders

The reform introduces a new category of trader status: Trust and Check Traders (TCT). To qualify, companies must provide comprehensive information on the movement and compliance of their goods and meet a range of stringent criteria. In return, they receive meaningful operational benefits, including simplified procedures for temporary storage and transit and the ability to release goods into free circulation without active customs intervention.

However, the existing Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) scheme will not be discontinued. Rather, TCT status represents a more advanced tier for economic operators. In exchange, TCT holders will grant customs authorities access to their electronic systems recording their compliance and the movement of their goods.

4. E-Commerce: Managing Small Parcels

Due to the massive influx of low-value packages into the EU — largely driven by platforms selling directly from third countries after the COVID-19 crisis — the e-commerce area will be reconsidered. First, an EU-wide handling fee and national handling fees in several EU member states have already been discussed. The fee is intended to help cover the rising costs of monitoring and processing the exponential growth in small-parcel volume. Second, the reform makes clear that e-commerce platforms and distance sellers are themselves importers. This means that these operators — rather than individual buyers — will be responsible for ensuring compliance with all customs formalities and payment of all applicable duties and fees. Third, a new system of financial penalties will apply to e-commerce operators that systematically fail to comply with their customs obligations, providing meaningful enforcement teeth behind the new regulatory framework.

The exact details still need to be reviewed and analyzed, as the politically agreed text is not yet available. However, the UCC reform legislative process is nearing completion and — barring surprises — is expected to be formally adopted by the end of 2026. Once published in the EU’s Official Journal, the regulation will become applicable 12 months later. Some provisions will enter into force at varied times, such as those relating to the establishment of the EU Customs Authority or the EU Customs Data Hub. Additional delegated and implementing acts remain in the EU’s legislative pipeline to complete the implementation and enforcement of this ambitious and much-needed EU customs reform.

On March 26, 2026, the Senate Judiciary Committee advanced S.2934, the Protecting Americans from Russian Litigation Act of 2025 (the Bill), introduced by Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Alex Padilla (D-CA) in September 2025. The Bill is intended to address situations where U.S. companies that exited Russia to comply with U.S. sanctions following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine faced retaliatory litigation in Russian courts resulting in adverse judgments, which judgments have then been enforced abroad.

If enacted, the Bill would add a new statute, Section 1660, to Title 28, and would bar any non-governmental party from filing a civil action in federal or state court to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment or foreign arbitral award in the United States where: (i) the underlying dispute arose from a party’s actions to comply with U.S. sanctions that impeded contract performance, or (ii) the foreign court or tribunal asserted jurisdiction based, in whole or in part, on the imposition of U.S. sanctions or export controls– or foreign countermeasures responding to them (e.g., blocking statutes) ((i) and (ii) together, Covered Actions).

For actions filed in state court, defendants may remove Covered Actions to federal district court, and the Bill directs federal courts to dismiss the Covered Action. The Bill would also apply to Covered Actions pending on or after the date of enactment.

Of note, the Bill would not apply to U.S. Government enforcement authority, including that enforcement brought by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), nor would it apply to certain other classes of plaintiffs including, among others: (i) victims of terrorism; (ii) litigation filed in the U.S. to assert contractual rights (other than to enforce a foreign judgment or foreign arbitral award that is a Covered Action) where the parties agreed to resolve their disputes in state or federal court; or (iii) any action arising under state or federal law (other than to enforce a foreign judgment or foreign arbitral award that is a Covered Action) premised on sanctions or export controls – as compared to a party’s actions to comply with U.S. sanctions.

The Bill’s definition of “United States sanctions” expressly refers to International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1702, the statute under which U.S. sanctions have been imposed relating to Russia, and extends to export-control authorities, capturing compliance obligations under OFAC regulations including the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  While the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) is not expressly included, the broad definition of “United States sanctions” suggests that TWEA-related judgments may constitute Covered Actions.

Notably, the Bill expressly excludes duties on imported goods, limiting the Bill’s applicability to purely tariff-based disputes which may have been based on IEEPA.

EU Considerations

The Bill mirrors similar protections offered under EU and UK sanctions regimes. For instance:

  • Council Regulations establishing EU restrictive measures (sanctions) typically include as a standard provision, known as the ‘no-claims clause’, that protects operators required to comply with EU sanctions from having to satisfy claims asserted by certain third parties (e.g., EU sanctioned persons/entities or Russian entities with respect to EU sectoral sanctions on Russia) when such claims are connected to the performance of a contract or transaction affected by EU sanctions.
  • The UK has not replicated the EU ‘no claims’ language as part of its post-Brexit sanctions regime.  Rather, section 44 of the UK’s Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provides a statutory defence to civil claims where a party reasonably believes that they were acting in compliance with UK sanctions. 

The EU and UK provisions have given rise to various interpretative questions, especially in the context of Russia-related sanctions litigation and arbitration. For instance, the UK’s s. 44 was addressed in a recent UK Supreme Court (the Court) decision UniCredit Bank v Celestial Aviation Service, in which the Court confirmed that s. 44 provides protection against an action to recover debt, an award of interest on the debt and an award of associated costs, where a failure to pay was due to a reasonable belief that the non-paying party was required to comply with UK sanctions.

From an EU perspective, a series of no claims-related questions have been submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), for example, regarding the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards in EU Member States and whether the no-claims provision prohibits (1) parties from reaching an out-of-court agreement to settle claims where the dispute relates to contracts not performed due to EU sanctions or (2) the repayment of an advance for goods or services that were not provided owing to sanctions. These cases are still pending.

Implications

If the Bill is enacted, it would provide a significant legal defense in the United States for companies that ceased Russian market activities as part of efforts to comply with U.S. sanctions and export controls. This is especially relevant for firms in sectors like aeronautics, shipping, energy, finance, logistics, construction, defense, and commodities. Companies with pending or potential exposure to Russian civil litigation may wish to consider this development if they are actively litigating such issues or are considering exiting the Russia market.

More significantly, given the Bill does not expressly limit itself to Russia-related litigation, it is possible that U.S. defendants facing Covered Actions may be able to assert the Bill as a defense relating to other jurisdictions or U.S. sanctions programs, such as Iran, Cuba, or blocked persons.

In light of the Bill, which has bipartisan sponsorship, companies that exited Russia or are considering exiting Russia may wish to consider:

  • Assessing any existing or threatened Russian litigation or arbitral proceedings connected to U.S. sanctions or export-control compliance decisions;
  • Documenting the good-faith compliance basis for Russia-related wind-downs or contract exits undertaken after February 2022;
  • Assessing whether pending civil enforcement actions in U.S. courts may be considered Covered Actions within the scope of proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1660; and
  • Monitoring the Senate Judiciary Committee’s consideration of S.2934 for further procedural developments, as well as potential foreign legislation which may be “reciprocal” or “retaliatory” and may restrict enforcement of US judgments in foreign countries.

Crowell will continue to monitor legislative and enforcement developments related to U.S. sanctions and export-control compliance obligations and their implications for affected industries.

On March 23, 2026, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) updated its Covered List—a list of communications equipment and services deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the safety and security of U.S. persons—to include consumer-grade routers produced in a foreign country, absent an exemption granted by the U.S. Departments of War (DoW) or Homeland Security (DHS). This designation effectively prohibits the import of all consumer routers that are not produced in the United States.

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On March 18 and 19, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued two new Venezuela-related general licenses: General License No. 52 (GL 52), authorizing most previously prohibited transactions involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA)  and General License No. 5V (GL 5V), authorizing further transactions related to the PdVSA 2020 8.5 Percent Bond issued on or after May 5, 2026.

Background: In 2018, OFAC imposed debt-related sanctions on PdVSA – Venezuela’s state-run oil company, which OFAC supplemented on January 28, 2019 by designating PdVSA on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List). Then, on August 5, 2019, OFAC’s imposition of asset-freezing sanctions on the Government of Venezuela, PdVSA’s parent entity, resulted in a third set of sanctions applying to PdVSA.

Change in Dynamic: Since January 2026, OFAC has issued a series of general licenses authorizing certain U.S. persons to conduct business with PdVSA, the Government of Venezuela, and other sanctioned Venezuelan persons. Yet, those general licenses focus exclusively on select activities for preidentified sectors. These new general licenses change that approach.  

New General License 52: GL 52 authorizes all transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13884 (the E.O. authorizing the imposition of asset-freezing sanctions on PdVSA) or E.O. 13850 (the E.O. authorizing the imposition of asset-freezing sanctions on the Government of Venezuela), if those transactions involve PdVSA, or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest (collectively, “PdVSA Entities”). A follow-on FAQ (OFAC FAQ 1245) from OFAC explains that this authorization includes activities related to

  • the lifting, exportation, reexportation, sale, resale, supply, storage, marketing, purchase, delivery, or transportation of Venezuelan oil or petroleum products of Venezuelan-origin oil and petroleum products;
  • the provision to Venezuela of diluent, goods, services, and technologies necessary for exploration, development, or production activities in the oil, gas, or petrochemical products sectors;
  • entry into new investment contracts for exploration, development, or production activities in the oil, gas, or petroleum products sectors of Venezuela;
  • the formation of new joint ventures or other entities in Venezuela related to such activities; and
  • all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to such activities, including the performance of commercial, legal, technical, safety, and environmental due diligence and assessments related to the foregoing.

Conditions for GL 52: However, similar to the other recently issued general licenses, there are stringent conditions.

  • The authorized transactions must be conducted by an “established U.S. entity.”  For purposes of GL 52, the term “established U.S. entity” means any entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States on or before January 29, 2025. 
  • Any contract with PdVSA or PdVSA entities must be governed by U.S. law and provide for dispute resolution in the United States.
  • Any monetary payment to a blocked person — other than local taxes, permits, or fees — must be directed into the Foreign Government Deposit Funds as specified in E.O. 14373 of January 9, 2026, or another account as instructed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
  • GL 52 does not authorize transactions otherwise prohibited by U.S. sanctions on Venezuela, such as transactions prohibited by E.O. 13808 related to bonds and certain other debt of the Government of Venezuela or PdVSA, nor transactions prohibited by E.O. 13835 related to the sale, transfer, assignment, or pledging as collateral of any equity interest in PdVSA, PdVSA Entities, or any other entity in which the Government of Venezuela holds a 50 percent or greater ownership interest. 
  • GL 52 also does not authorize settlement agreements, enforcement of liens, judgments, arbitral awards, or other judicial processes purporting to transfer blocked property. 
  • All terms must be commercially reasonable payment terms and cannot include debt swaps, payments in gold or Venezuelan digital currency (including the petro).
  • Transactions cannot involve persons located in or organized under the laws of Russia, Iran, North Korea, or Cuba, entities owned, controlled, or in a joint venture with persons in those jurisdictions or in China, or other persons subject to U.S. sanctions other than PdVSA itself or PdVSA Entities. 
  • Lastly, any person that exports, reexports, sells, resells, or supplies Venezuelan-origin oil or petrochemical products to countries other than the United States under GL 52 must submit detailed reports to Sanctions_inbox@state.gov and VZReporting@doe.gov, within ten days of the first such transaction, with follow-on reports required every 90 days while transactions remain ongoing. In GL 52, OFAC describes what must be in the report.

Updated General License 5V: GL 5V separately authorizes, on or after May 5, 2026, all transactions related to, the provision of financing for, and other dealings in the PdVSA 2020 8.5 Percent Bond that would otherwise be prohibited by E.O. 13835, as amended by E.O. 13857.  OFAC has a long history of issuing an iteration of GL 5 and replacing it by a subsequent authorization, which has had the impact of delaying the effective date since the very first replacement of GL 5 in October 2019.

Companies should continue to monitor OFAC’s Venezuela sanctions program for any further amendments, revocations, or supplemental guidance affecting the scope of GL 52 and GL 5V. Relevant requirements under other federal authorities, including the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) remain in effect – companies should therefore continue to assess whether equipment, technology, or services associated with oil activity implicate export licensing, end-use, or end-user restrictions, particularly where transactions involve sensitive jurisdictions or intermediaries.

On March 12th, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) initiated investigations under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 of 60 countries for potential forced labor violations resulting in unfair competition for US companies selling abroad. According to U.S. Trade Representative Jameison Greer, the investigations will examine whether these countries have failed to take adequate measures to prevent goods produced with forced labor from entering global supply chains in a manner that burdens or restricts U.S. commerce and places U.S. exporters at a competitive disadvantage abroad.

The full list of all 60 countries covered by the investigation can be found at the USTR announcement and ranges from China to Switzerland, including several of the United States’ largest trading partners. If USTR determines that the acts, policies, or practices under review are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden U.S. Commerce, the agency may impose several remedies including tariffs, import restrictions, or the suspension of trade agreements.

Public hearings on the matter are scheduled to take place between April 28th and May 1st, 2026, with written comments due by April 15th, 2026. For countries without a trade agreement with the United States, a determination is generally expected within 12 months after the investigation begins.

USTR has previously investigated forced labor concerns in the context of Nicaragua. In 2024, the Biden administration initiated the first-ever Section 301 investigation targeting labor rights, human rights and rule of law violations. On October 20, 2025, USTR determined that Nicaragua’s acts, policies and practices were unreasonable and burdened U.S. commerce, and structured a remedy phased in over two years on all imported Nicaraguan goods, rising to 10 percent on January 1, 2027 and 15 percent on January 1, 2028.  This gives a concrete template for what may follow for other economies.

Companies with international supply chains or export operations involving the affected jurisdictions should monitor the investigations closely, as any resulting trade measures could impact sourcing strategies and compliance obligations.  In the policy context, these new Section 301 investigations represent a strategic shift to use Section 301’s forced labor authority as the legal backbone for a broad global tariff regime, after IEEPA-based tariffs were struck down.  Companies importing from any of the 60 covered economies face potential new tariffs and must urgently audit forced labor exposure across their supply chains.
Targeting close allies like the EU, UK, Canada, Japan, and Australia on forced labor grounds — economies with their own robust enforcement laws — is likely to generate significant diplomatic friction.

For additional information regarding submissions of comments or participation in the hearing, please feel free to reach out to Crowell & Moring for assistance.

Introduction

Over the last two months, OFAC has issued and updated a series of general licenses and Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) that allow for a variety of activities in the Venezuela oil, gas, petrochemical products, electricity, and gold sectors when they involve persons sanctioned pursuant to the Venezuela sanctions regulations, including the Government of Venezuela (GOV) and its state-owned oil company PdVSA. 

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In what amounts to a material expansion of its existing sanctions program arising out of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”), on March 2, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced sanctions against the Rwanda Defence Force (“RDF”)—an organization described by OFAC as Rwanda’s military—along with four senior RDF officials. According to Treasury, the RDF has been “supporting, training, and fighting alongside” M23, an armed group already designated by both the United States and United Nations and operating in the eastern DRC. Treasury tied the action  to alleged violations of the “Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity,” including a recent M23 offensive that resulted in the capture of the city of Uvira in eastern DRC.

Under this blocking action, all property and interests in property of the RDF and the designated officials that are in the United States, or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings with the designated parties unless authorized by OFAC.

OFAC’s “50 Percent Rule” also applies to entities owned, directly or indirectly, 50% or more– individually or in the aggregate– by one or more blocked persons, even if not separately identified on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (“SDN”) List.  

Also on March, 2, 2026, OFAC issued Treasury’s General License No. 1 under the DRC Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 547). The General License authorizes transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to wind down pre-existing dealings involving the RDF, and any entity owned 50 percent or more by the RDF, through April 1, 2026.  The authorization is limited and it does not permit the initiation of new business, nor does it unfreeze blocked property.  Any payments involving a blocked person must be placed into a blocked account.  The General License also does not authorize transactions with any other persons blocked under the DRC program (or any other otherwise-prohibited conduct) unless separately authorized.

These actions build on Treasury’s February 20, 2025 designations of James Kabarebe and Lawrence Kanyuka Kingston, along with two associated companies registered in the United Kingdom and France. The March 2026 designations reflect a continued expansion of Treasury’s focus from individual actors to state-affiliated institutions alleged to be supporting destabilizing activities in the DRC.

Practically, companies with operations, counterparties, or financial flows connected to Rwanda, or the DRC region, particularly those with potential connections to regional military or defense sector or supply chains, should treat this development as an immediate compliance priority. In particular, businesses involved in regional logistics, extractive industries, commodities trading, defense-related activities or financial services should consider:

  • Conducting enhanced screening of counterparties and beneficial owners;
  • Reviewing existing contracts for potential RDF nexus;
  • Assessing whether wind-down activity is required before April 1, 2026; and
  • Confirming that any required blocking and reporting procedures are implemented.

Crowell & Moring will continue to monitor developments related to sanctions enforcement actions and their potential impact to industry.

On February 26, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) reached an administrative enforcement settlement with Teledyne FLIR LLC and its affiliates FLIR Optoelectronic Technology (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. and Teledyne FLIR Commercial Systems, Inc. d/b/a Teledyne FLIR OEM, (together, “Teledyne FLIR”), imposing a $1,000,000 civil penalty to resolve alleged violations of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”).

According to BIS, Teledyne FLIR voluntarily self-disclosed 19 alleged violations between 2017 and 2024 tied to exports, reexports, and related conduct involving thermal imaging cameras under export control classification numbers (“ECCN”) 6A003 and 6A993.a. The penalties broke into four types of violations:

  • Causation: BIS alleged that Teledyne FLIR caused nine exports from abroad of ECCN 6A003 thermal imaging cameras from a Swedish affiliate to China without required BIS authorization, based in part on incorrect calculations under the EAR’s de minimis rule in 15 C.F.R. Part 734.
  • Evasion: BIS alleged an evasion-related fact pattern involving a 2018 collaboration with a Chinese drone manufacturer concerning the Zenmuse XT2, a project involving the integration of a FLIR camera for use with civilian drones. This evasion scheme consisted of a pricing structure that BIS alleged was designed to keep U.S.-controlled content below the de minimis threshold and did not reflect the fair market value of the items.
  • Failure to Keep Records: BIS alleged failures to comply with license-condition recordkeeping requirements for certain demonstrations by the Shanghai affiliate.
  • Exports to Entity List Address: BIS alleged eight unlicensed exports of ECCN 6A993.a thermal cameras to company included on the Entity List for being an “address only” company (i.e., part of a shell company). Under EAR § 744.16, a license was required for exports of any items listed on the Commerce Control List.

This action is a useful reminder that conducting a “de minimis” analysis is not a box-checking exercise and can be more complicated that it seems. When you assess the valuation of the controlled U.S.-origin item, it should reflect the fair market value of that item when it was exported from the United States and account for items customarily included (and actually shipped) with the controlled U.S.-origin item. BIS can view any attempts to “engineer” pricing to fall below the applicable de minimis thresholds as an evasion violation.

The settlement also underscores that exporters should not rely solely on name-based denied-party screening; address-only Entity List entries require address-level controls and, often, manual review. Companies should be sure that their screening providers both screen for these address-only Entity List entries and that their algorithms and fuzzy logic appropriately capture those addresses.

Lastly, the settlement is a good reminder that companies should be mindful of all license requirements and have in place disciplined recordkeeping processes when authorizations are obtained. Without these controls, U.S. export violations can quickly multiply.

Crowell & Moring will continue to monitor developments related to export control enforcement actions and their potential impact to industry.

On February 9, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Office of Investment Security (OIS) published a request for information (RFI) seeking public comments on how the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) might streamline its foreign investment review process, including through the Known Investor Program (KIP). The RFI requests feedback on (1) proposed eligibility criteria and a draft questionnaire for the KIP, including certain defined terms, and (2) other ways that CFIUS and transaction parties can streamline aspects of the foreign investment review process. Written comments are due March 18, 2026.

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On February 6, 2026, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) announced the launch of a new online Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD) Portal (the “New Portal”) intended to replace and reduce reliance on ad hoc submission methods with a more secure channel for reporting to OFAC potential sanctions violations. OFAC states that moving disclosures into the New Portal should improve process visibility for disclosing parties, including faster acknowledgment and clearer communication during OFAC’s review. Of note, “OFAC strongly encourages parties to begin submitting voluntary self-disclosures through” the New Portal.

From a submission mechanics standpoint, the New Portal’s form is designed to be completed in roughly 30 minutes and asks for core identifying information for the disclosing party and a primary correspondent (for example, if an entity or individual is represented by counsel), plus supporting documentation uploads.  The New Portal limits uploads to 15 files, restricts file size to no larger than 30 megabytes (MB), and accepts only certain common formats (.PDF, .DOC, .DOCX, .XLS, .XLSX, .JPEG, .JPG or .PNG). Previously, there was a 150 MB maximum, with a maximum of 50 MB per email, before OFAC required submitting through a large file transfer system. As before, the New Portal requires optical character recognition (OCR) on all PDFs prior to submission.

For extensive or document-intensive submissions, OFAC requests that submitters continue to use OFAC’s Production Submission Standards, which cover package organization, sequential pagination, Excel-compatible spreadsheets, and transmission protocols, including secure transfers with ID.me authentication. Compliance with these standards may factor into OFAC’s evaluation of cooperation.

The New Portal is a reminder that OFAC’s current Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) explicitly note that a qualifying VSD is treated as a mitigating factor in any penalty assessment. In addition, where OFAC determines a civil monetary penalty is warranted, a qualifying VSD can result in a 50 percent reduction in the maximum possible penalty (with the precise calculation mechanics depending on whether OFAC treats the case as egregious or non-egregious), provided the VSD meets the criteria in the Guidelines. As we have previously noted, organizations that promptly report potential violations to OFAC may receive reduced penalties or even avoid enforcement altogether.

Crowell & Moring LLP regularly advises U.S. and foreign companies on VSDs to OFAC and related investigations. Please contact the authors regarding questions about VSDs or the New Portal.