Webinar Thursday, January 17, 2019
1:00 – 2:30 pm EST

What can government contractors expect in 2019?  Join the Crowell & Moring team on Thursday, January 17 at 1:00 pm to discuss likely trends for the coming year.  We’ll cover a variety of topics including cost and DCAA matters, bid protests, cybersecurity, congressional oversight, international and national security issues, claims, ethics/compliance, digital transformation, small business, False Claims Act, and so much more.

Presenters include some of the most experienced practitioners in the field. We hope you will join us for this free and informative webinar.

 

For questions about this webinar, please email Denise Giardina at DGiardina@crowell.com.

 

On November 28, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) released the first ever draft global standard for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations. The standard, titled Draft International Standard for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations, represents an important step in standardizing UAS operations around the world. Although ISO will publish the standard for global adoption starting in 2019, compliance is not mandatory. The standard is nevertheless important because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and sister agencies worldwide will likely use it as a foundation for future rulemaking. Operators, service providers, and manufacturers should thus strongly consider early adoption of the standard in preparing for forthcoming regulation.

The draft, ISO 21384-3, is the first in a four-part series of UAS standards that ISO is currently developing. The next three draft standards are to address general specifications, manufacturing, and unmanned traffic management. This maiden draft addresses operational procedures, making it particularly relevant to anyone who operates UAS for commercial purposes. The draft standard covers safety, autonomous operations, data protection, and overall operational etiquette.

The standard, not surprisingly, first directs UAS operators to follow the existing statutes and regulations of the operators’ jurisdictions. But it also provides guidance for use in the absence of specific regulations. For instance, for commercial operators in the United States flying under the FAA’s Small UAS Rule (Part 107), the standard includes recommendations for properly logging flights, implementing a safety management system, employing training and maintenance standards, and updating UAS hardware and software. Many commercial UAS operators agree that those subjects are valuable and important for the continued development of the UAS industry, but the FAA has not yet addressed them in a formal rulemaking. The ISO draft standard may prompt reconsideration of the value of (or need for) formal rules in these areas and others it covers.

The ISO has invited drone professionals, academics, businesses, and the general public to submit comments on the draft standard. Those comments are due by January 21, 2019. Given the likelihood that the draft standard will influence upcoming FAA rules, among others, businesses that utilize UAS technology would be well-advised to review the draft standard and consider what comments they might contribute. Even businesses that do not yet employ UAS technology would be well served to focus, since new applications for UAS are rapidly emerging in a host of industries, including in the agricultural, maritime, insurance, construction, and energy sectors.

 

Safe drone implementation is transforming businesses and municipalities, resulting in significant cost savings, improved workplace safety, and more reliable work product. A standards-led adoption of drone technology promises to allow commercial operators to integrate drone operations into their business models safely and confidently.

Webinar – November 8, 2018

Starts: 1:00 PM (EDT)
Ends: 2:00 PM (EDT)

3D printing is a leading technology that transforms how and where goods are designed, made (printed), distributed, and sold.  Government agencies, including the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, have engaged in initiatives to promote innovation related to 3D printing.  As companies gain efficiencies through transitioning to 3D printing, and government encourages its use, government contractors should be alert to the myriad of compliance considerations involved in selling 3D printed parts pursuant to public contracts.

Join the Crowell & Moring team on Thursday, November 8th at 1:00 pm EDT to discuss strategies for transitioning the manufacture of goods for sale to the government to an additive, 3D printing process.  Our team of experienced practitioners and consultants will walk through a range of compliance considerations – from supplier and material approval requirements to inspection and cybersecurity considerations – to arm you with the knowledge you need to implement this forward-looking technology while maintaining compliance with rigorous government regulations.

We hope you will join us for the free webinar.

Speakers

  • Gail Zirkelbach, Partner
  • Mana Lombardo, Counsel
  • Michael Gruden, Associate

 

Contact: Kim Peters (202.508.8991, kpeters@crowell.com)
Register

 

On October 23, 2018, the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a notice seeking comments on imposing export control restrictions on electronic waste in response to concerns that unregulated recycling of electronic waste is a source of counterfeit goods. BIS has proposed to define electronic waste, prohibit electronic waste export, establish electronic waste exemptions, and require an export license to ship exempted electronic waste abroad. The Bureau is seeking public comment until December 24, 2018 on all aspects of the proposal including the definition, methods of tracking exported electronic waste, costs, and the likely effectiveness of the regulations.

Join Us For A Complimentary Webinar – Thursday, October 25, 2018 – 12:00 – 1:00 PM ET

Two years into the Trump Administration and:

  • The Consumer Product Safety Commission now has a Republican majority,
  • the Department of Transportation has released its 3.0 guidance on autonomous vehicles,
  • NIST has published a 375-page recommendation on medical device security,
  • the FTC is holding a series of hearings on the transformative nature of the digital transformation on markets.

What does all this activity in the United States mean for companies following the rapidly evolving regulations globally related to the safety and security of products?

This webinar will describe the current landscape at the federal agencies setting policy for product safety and security. With all the recent talk of regulatory humility in the face of great technological change, we’ll discuss whether regulators practice what they preach and if recent actions encourage or stifle innovation. Our session will compare and contrast activities across the federal government relevant to consumer products broadly defined with a particular focus on product safety and security.

Presenters:

Cheryl Falvey, Partner, Crowell & Moring, Washington, DC
John Fuson, Partner, Crowell & Moring, Washington, DC
Peter Miller, Senior CounselCrowell & Moring, Washington, DC

 

Please click here to register for this webinar.

 

As a consequence of U.S. and UN sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), companies increasingly need to coordinate compliance efforts across the typically distinct worlds of economic sanctions and import/customs compliance. This is particularly necessary with respect to identifying, and mitigating the risk of DPRK-related labor in supply chains. Below, we summarize first the expanded scope of UN restrictions on the DPRK, including the prohibition on the use of DPRK labor, and then second, how those rules have been implemented and expanded in the United States in increasingly complex ways.

Part I:    United Nations Restrictions:

The United Nations has maintained limited sanctions on North Korea for years, but in 2017 it expanded those sanctions in a number of material ways.  Of relevance to this analysis, the UN Security Council (UNSC) reached a determination that all DPRK labor outside of North Korea poses a high forced labor-related risk.  As a result, the UNSC first required that all new work visas for DPRK citizens be approved by the UNSC, before expanding that restriction in December 2017 (UNSCR 2397) to require all UN Member States to repatriate all DPRK workers currently employed in their territory “immediately but not later than 24 months” (i.e., December 2019).  Therefore, for example Chinese and Taiwanese companies could currently employ DPRK citizens, but they will be required to reduce that employment and ultimately curtail it, or risk violation of UN resolutions.

Part II:   U.S. Restrictions:

In parallel, the United States has implemented a growing array of restrictions that also target DPRK labor.  Below, we summarize the relevant (a) U.S. sanctions prohibiting transactions with the DPRK and (b) a parallel set of import requirements presumptively prohibiting products manufactured with DPRK nationals in the supply chain:

(1) U.S. Sanctions on the DPRK:

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has maintained a comprehensive embargo on the DPRK since 2017 and more limited restrictions for decades. Today, OFAC prohibits the export of any goods or services to the DPRK  and any transactions with the Government of North Korea or the Workers Party of North Korea.  OFAC generally considers a transaction with a DPRK national ordinarily resident in the DPRK to be prohibited as an indirect export of a service to the DPRK.

Importantly, for this analysis, OFAC also prohibits the importation of any goods or services from the DPRK, even items with only a de minimis percentage DPRK content (e.g., a $10,000 widget produced in Russia with a $2 North Korean origin part would be considered North Korean origin and prohibited entry into the United States).

Over the last few months, we have seen that OFAC has aggressively expanded its enforcement of these provisions, including designation of persons involved in DPRK trade, and issuing advisories to the shipping community about DPRK risks in the supply chain.  See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm458; https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/dprk_vessel_advisory_02232018.pdf; and https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/dprk_supplychain_advisory_07232018.pdf.

(2) DPRK-Related Import Prohibitions:

In parallel, since August 2017, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) has maintained a North Korean related import restriction.  Specifically, pursuant to Section 321(b) of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”), CBP utilizes a presumption that any “significant goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part by the labor of North Korean nationals or citizens” is produced through forced labor and therefore is prohibited for entry into the United States.  The presumption can be rebutted only through “clear and convincing” evidence that the DPRK nationals are not forced labor (e.g., a demonstration that they are asylees or refugees in a third country).  To assist importers in meeting their “reasonable care” obligation to ensure that goods entering the United States meet these new provisions, the Department of Homeland Security has published CAATSA Section 321(b) Guidance on due diligence steps importers can take, while CBP has noted that the seafood industry presents a high risk of DPRK nationals.  See e.g., https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/spotlights/cbp-leads-delegation-thailand-discusses-forced-labor-concerns-fishing-industry.

Part III: Significant Points for Importers, Exporters and U.S. Companies

The net result of the overlap of the above restrictions is:

  • All U.S. and non-U.S. companies are prohibited to grant new work permits to DPRK nationals, except DPRK nationals seeking an asylum or refugee status.
  • U.S. companies are prohibited under U.S. sanctions law from directly or indirectly exporting goods or services to the DPRK, including transacting with persons ordinarily resident in the DPRK.
  • U.S. companies are prohibited under U.S. sanctions to import any products produced in whole or in part (no matter how small the percentage) with DPRK origin material into the United States.
  • All products manufactured in whole, or in part, with DPRK national labor are presumptively considered to be produced with forced labor and are therefore prohibited to enter the United States, unless the importer can demonstrate through “clear and convincing” evidence that the DPRK nationals were not forced labor (e.g., by demonstrating they are asylum seekers).

 

On August 17, 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) published a document entitled, “Responsible Business Practices on Forced Labor Risk in the Global Supply Chain“, which provides details regarding the best practices for importers of goods into the U.S. The agency indicated that the guidelines were published in order to further CBP’s strategic goal to stop the importation of goods produced with forced labor. The Office of Trade also recommends the adoption of the Department of Labor (DOL) Comply Chain principles in order to create a social compliance system. To this end, the DOL has made an APP available for download called Sweat & Toil, which identifies problematic countries, commodities, and types of exploitation.

Finally, CBP’s Responsible Business Practices document recommends that a company review the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises because they provide non-binding principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a global context consistent with applicable laws and internationally recognized standards. These guidelines are the only multilateral and comprehensive code of responsible business conduct that governments have agreed to promote.

For further information regarding Forced Labor and your supply chain please does not hesitate to contact us.

 

On May 18, 2018, CBP issued a Withhold Release Order (WRO) banning the importation of all Turkmenistan cotton or products produced in whole or in part with Turkmenistan cotton. The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) was signed into law P.L. 114-125 on February 24, 2016. It was created to ensure a fair and competitive trade environment. TFTEA prohibits all products made by forced labor, including child labor, from being imported into the United States.

On April 6, 2016, members of the U.S. Cotton Campaign, Alternative Turkmenistan News, and International Labor Rights Forum had submitted a petition to CBP requesting the agency ban the importation of all goods made with Turkmen cotton produced with forced labor under 19 U.S.C. § 1307.  Merchandise made with forced labor is subject to exclusion and/or seizure, and may lead to criminal investigation of the importer(s).

These three groups alleged that the Turkmen government forces public sector employees under threat of punishment, including loss of wages and termination of employment, to pick cotton. Further, the groups claimed that “[i]n the 2017 cotton harvest, in addition to forced mobilization of adults, the government of Turkmenistan forced children 10-15 years old to pick cotton in violation of international and domestic laws,” he added. When information reasonably but not conclusively indicates that merchandise made with forced labor is being imported, CBP may issue a WRO pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(e).

CBP’s ban means retailers and brands need to move quickly to identify and eliminate Turkmen cotton from their supply chains.

On Valentine’s Day, two subcommittees of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology held a joint hearing on the potential application of blockchain technology beyond cryptocurrency and financial technology. This hearing highlights the U.S. Government’s growing interest in blockchain, a Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) that has powered platforms for secure and decentralized transactions. While its most visible exponent, Bitcoin, has been a hot topic, blockchain is gaining traction among some federal agencies as a tool of the future.

Given the sheer data demands on modern government, blockchain, which would enable what some call “democratized trust,” shows promise to cut red tape without compromising the security and integrity of government transactions. The potential use cases for blockchain are many—just to name a few: identity management, supply chain management, smart contracts, patents, and foreign aid delivery. Federal government agencies are making their own forays into this area:

  • Department of Homeland Security: prove the integrity of captured data from border devices to help secure the Internet of Things (IoT);
  • GSA: automating the FASt Lane process for IT Schedule 70 contracts to give end-user agencies quicker access to innovative suppliers;
  • Navy: secure sharing of data within the Naval Additive Manufacturing process.

But, the government is still cautious. With a view towards cybersecurity vulnerabilities, Section 1646 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act requires DoD to brief on the offensive and defensive cyber applications of blockchain by the early half of this year. In practice, the government has been experimenting mostly through vehicles such as proofs of concepts and Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) projects. These initiatives, while distinct from traditional procurements, provide low-cost opportunities for entry. Industry should be on the lookout for ways to engage the government and articulate viable uses of blockchain for particular mission requirements.

If importers did not have enough to worry about in the new trade protectionist environment – higher duties from dumping, subsidy, section 201 and section 232 cases and increased enforcement – now they also may have to contend with the increased risks of whistleblower cases brought under the False Claims Act (FCA).  31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33.  The FCA has been around for more than 150 years, but recently, has been successfully used to allege underpayment of duties.  Actions under the FCA can be brought directly by the Department of Justice (DOJ) or by a private party, known as a relator, seeking recovery on behalf of the U.S. government in a qui tam action. There are strong incentives for relators to file qui tam suits in light of the statute’s treble damages and penalties and its provision allowing relators to receive a share of up to 30 percent of any recovery. Qui tam actions are filed under seal, and before the case is unsealed to the public, the government is given an opportunity to investigate and determine whether or not it will intervene in the action.  In some cases, the government’s investigation can last not just months but years, often involving extensive one-sided discovery that DOJ is granted under the FCA.  And, even when the government declines to intervene, a relator can still independently proceed with the litigation.  Only if the government affirmatively moves to dismiss the qui tam could the relator not proceed, something that DOJ has historically been extremely reluctant to do.

Traditionally, FCA suits have been based on allegations that a party improperly received payment from the government, but importers must also be aware of the potential exposure associated with the “reverse” FCA provision of the statute, which imposes liability on any person who “knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.”  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).  Under the statute, the knowledge element can be established by (1) actual knowledge (2) deliberate ignorance; or (3) reckless disregard.  See § 3729(b)(1).

Importers have become targets of reverse FCA claims associated with duty evasion in part because a recent case from the Third Circuit.  United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co. The Third Circuit held that a failure to mark country of origin could be actionable under a reverse FCA theory of liability if a company knowingly imported unmarked products in an effort to evade custom duties.  839 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2016).  The court found that Victaulic had an established obligation under 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) to disclose to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) the fact that its goods were unmarked or improperly marked and if Victaulic knowingly failed to notify the CBP of its pipe fittings’ non-conforming status, this could give rise to reverse false claims liability for the unpaid marking duties.  In May 2017, Victaulic filed a petition for a writ of certiorari but the Supreme Court denied the petition this past October, leaving Victaulic to defend itself in the district court. While that case has not reached a judgment, the concern for importers is clear given the court of appeals’ validation of such a theory under the FCA.

Other recent cases have targeted companies importing goods that are subject to antidumping and countervailing duties. In 2016, Z Gallerie LLC paid $15 million to settle whistleblower FCA allegations that it masked the type of furniture it imported from China in order to avoid extra dumping duties. Basset Mirror Company paid $10.5 million to settle a similar case on furniture from China just this past month.  The rise in FCA cases related to import duties was highlighted in the recent Wall Street Journal article, in which it stated that the DOJ collected $4.7 billion in fiscal 2016 and $3.7 billion as a result of False Claims suits brought by whistleblowers in fiscal 2017.

These cases, combined with increased duties as a result of numerous unfair trade proceedings, create a perfect storm – encouraging both FCA plaintiffs’ lawyers and whistleblowers alike to cash in on a company’s failure to comply with import laws.  FCA claims are not limited to marking or dumping matters.  Cases may be brought if importers incorrectly value or classify imported goods, or make incorrect duty free claims based on a free trade agreement.

With all this troubling news, there are steps that importers may take to mitigate the risks or defend against an FCA claim. First, importers should establish strong internal compliance programs. Even if internal controls fall short of ensuring 100% compliance with import laws, a strong compliance program can be important evidence if an importer is forced to defend an FCA suit because the plaintiff (whether DOJ or a relator) must establish that an importer acted with the requisite knowledge—i.e., the plaintiff must show that the noncompliance occurred because the importer acted with actual knowledge or at least reckless disregard.  The existence of robust internal controls could be essential in helping an importer overcome a finding of reckless disregard.  Second, and related to having a strong compliance program, taking steps to investigate, identify, and disclose to the government any errors made could foreclose FCA liability in other ways, too.  For instance, if a company makes a disclosure concerning a potentially improper practice and the agency response is to take no formal action, that may show that the practice is not material to the government’s decision to pay or the potential obligation for the company to pay (in the case of import duties).

The materiality of alleged false statements or claims has been receiving enormous scrutiny recently in the wake of the Supreme Court’s landmark FCA decision in 2016 in Universal Health Services v. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016), with agency approval or failure to disapprove of allegedly fraudulent conduct repeatedly being cited in dismissing actions for failing to show materiality.  Moreover, if a company discloses to the government their practices or interpretations with respect to regulations they are subject to, what is known as the government knowledge bar can also foreclose a finding of FCA liability.  In short, while there is often no sure-fire way to avoid mistakes in transactions involving government dollars, there are various proactive measures a company can take to help prevent mistakes from turning into a case of alleged fraud.