The 116th Congress begins on January 3, 2019. Based on projections from yesterday’s midterms, Democrats will control the House of Representatives by a narrow margin, while Republicans will expand their hold on the Senate. The changes to Congress are likely to shape trade policy through 2019, but much will depend on how House Democrats use their new majority, and whether trade is a priority issue or whether it will be overtaken by domestic issues.

Companies will have to carefully navigate the new political environment in order to advance their policy objectives. In addition to accounting for the hard-nosed approach to trade taken by the current administration, an effective policy engagement strategy will have to account for the new political dynamics created by newly empowered House Democrats and a potentially polarized Congress. Companies should be prepared to intervene on issues that are likely to come up in 2019, including: ratification of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA); trade negotiations with the EU, Japan, and the UK; and the ongoing U.S. tariff interventions on China and for sensitive sectors.

Below is our best forecast for the makeup of the trade- and foreign affairs-related committees for the 116th Congress, and their voting record on key pieces of trade legislation:



China PNTR

U.S.-Colombia FTA  (2012)

Korea-U.S.-FTA (2012)


House Ways and Means
Chair: Richard Neal (D-Massachusetts)






Ranking Member: Kevin Brady (R-Texas)






House Foreign Affairs
Chair: Eliot Engel (D-New York)






Ranking Member: Michael McCaul (R-Texas) OR






Joe Wilson (R-South Carolina)






Senate Finance
Chair: Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) OR






Mike Crapo (R-Idaho)

Nay (as House member)





Ranking Member: Ron Wyden (D-Oregon)






Senate Foreign Relations
Chair: Jim Risch (R-Idaho)






Ranking Member: Bob Menendez (D-New Jersey)






* China Permanent Normal Trade Relations
** Trade Promotion Authority

We expect the following impacts on 2019 U.S. trade priorities:

Impact on U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA)

The new USMCA is expected to be signed at the end of this month. USMCA would have likely passed in a Republican-held Congress on a bumpy but ultimately consistent trajectory. It will still likely enjoy broad backing in the Republican Senate. With Democrats now in control the House, there may be some new challenges to ratification.

Some of the new provisions in USMCA give cover for Democratic support—including the new wage-based rule of origin for autos and new enforceable labor rules, along with the weakening of investor-state dispute settlement. The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN), which includes the leaders of United Steelworkers and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, last week expressed unanimous support for the agreement. But these changes still might not be enough to gain wide Democratic support. The Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (LAC) noted several reservations on the agreement. Major environmental groups are also already preparing for a major advocacy campaign against USMCA. We expect House Democrats to seek additional concessions from the administration, particularly on the enforceability of the new labor provisions, on the environment, or possibly in the area of intellectual property protections.

If USMCA is signed on November 30, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) would have to publish a study on its probable economic impacts by March 15, 2019, according to Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) procedures. The agreement could theoretically be voted on at any point after publication of the report, but difficulties in assembling the needed votes for implementing legislation would likely delay the process. The Trump Administration may still attempt to withdraw from the existing NAFTA as a tactic to force Congress to pass USMCA. It remains unclear how House Democrats or Senate Republicans would react to such a threat. The role of the business community will be key. The White House would look to U.S. business, including agribusiness, to generate bipartisan support for the agreement.

Impact on Future U.S. FTAs: U.S.-Japan, U.S.-EU, U.S.-UK

The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) notified Congress on October 16 of its intention to begin negotiations for trade agreements with Japan, the EU, and the UK. The earliest that formal negotiations for the Japan and EU agreements could start is January 14, while negotiations with the UK would have to wait until after Brexit on March 29. USTR’s negotiating objectives for these agreements could be published in December or later.

For the new Congress, the Republican majority in the Senate and Democratic majority in the House will have differing sets of concerns for the new negotiations. Senate Republicans will seek many of the outcomes they sought in the NAFTA renegotiation. The Democratic House leadership is likely to call for new measures on labor and the environment, intellectual property, and/or dispute settlement. Some of these, such as opposition to investor-state dispute statement, would resonate with USTR Lighthizer and the White House, though it’s not clear how far the administration would move in the Democrats’ direction on labor or environmental issues. Consideration of the USMCA will be an early test on issues of concern to Democrats that will have implications for other agreements.

USTR is seeking short-term delivery of less controversial outcomes on regulatory alignment and other limited market access issues (such as an enlarged quota for high-quality beef and sales of U.S. soybeans) as part of an early harvest for negotiations with the EU, while with Japan the immediate priorities appear to be focused on market access for autos and agriculture.  Such priorities are not likely to require Congressional ratification and so will be less affected by the changes in Congress.

Impact on Section 301 tariffs

President Trump is expected to meet with President Xi at the G20 Summit in Argentina on November 30- December 1. While the White House has downplayed expectations for the meeting, others see the possibility of beginning a meaningful U.S.-China dialogue and perhaps moderating or delaying additional tariff actions. If no accommodation or way forward is reached, the U.S. has indicated it will increase existing tariffs on certain goods from 10 percent to 25 percent in January, with some reports that the U.S. could also impose new tariffs on nearly all remaining Chinese imports. China would likely respond in kind to any new tariffs.

The new Congress is not likely to change the direction of the U.S. economic relationship with China, although the plight of U.S. farmers facing their worst economic year in a long time might have some effect in pushing individual Members of Congress to seek a moderate course. We expect Republicans in the Senate will continue to have concerns on the impacts of China’s retaliation on the broader economy, but still be reluctant to contradict the administration’s approach. The Democratic-controlled House may be more enthusiastic in supporting tariffs overall and could give the Trump Administration cover to take a harder line if circumstances warrant, although may push back where there are specific constituent impacts. In fact, if the Trump Administration reaches a deal with China at the end of November (or anytime afterward), incoming House Democrats could use their newfound leverage to criticize the administration’s efforts and seek to outflank the administration on China issues. China policy is certain to figure in both parties’ presidential election campaigns as the 2020 presidential election begins to take shape during 2019.

While the current approach broadly to China is likely to continue, there may be enough bipartisan support for the new Congress to continue pushing the administration for a product-exclusion process for the 10 percent tranche of tariffs announced last September.

Impact on Section 232 tariffs

The Trump Administration has implemented tariffs on all imports of steel and aluminum, subject to certain country-specific exceptions. Negotiations for some country-specific exclusions could continue through 2019 (e.g., for Canada, Mexico, Japan, or the EU). In addition, the Trump Administration is considering implementation of tariffs on imports of autos and auto parts.

Changes to the control of Congress are not likely to affect the ongoing Section 232 tariffs related to steel and aluminum. House Democrats and Senate Republicans are likely to take positions on the Section 232 tariffs based on the economic impact for their district or state. Members from steel-heavy districts and states will continue to be supportive of the tariffs, while those from districts and states suffering from negative economic consequences because of retaliation or increased downstream costs are more likely to oppose.

Unless the Trump Administration imposes additional tariffs, we would not expect the new Congress to pass legislation designed to restrict the president’s Section 232 authority, as introduced by Senator Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) in the Senate and Representative Mike Gallagher (R-Wisconsin) in the House earlier this summer. That legislation did not have the votes to pass at the time, and the new Democratic majority in the House is not likely to increase the chances of passage.

In the area of the administration’s potential imposition Section 232 tariffs on autos and auto parts, the economic consequences of the tariffs and any resultant retaliation from other countries are likely to be broad. We would continue to expect a significant degree of bipartisan Congressional opposition to new Section 232 tariffs on autos.

Interaction between International Trade and Domestic Issues

Domestic factors are likely to dominate in shaping international trade and economic policy over the course of the new Congress and the remainder of President Trump’s term. Emerging issues, including renewed interest in comprehensive U.S. federal privacy legislation, could influence future U.S. trade-related rules (e.g., on cross-border data flows) as well as set policy models that other governments could replicate.

While the Trump Administration may be keen to pivot to international issues given its lack of a Congressional majority at home, its ability to negotiate and conclude agreements on multiple fronts could be complicated as it seeks to manage an increased array of investigations and oversight by the Congress. Add to this the inevitable turnover of Cabinet members and White House and Executive Branch staff changes that will occur after the mid-terms, and the administration may see a temporary hiatus in undertaking new policy initiatives, including on trade.

Furthermore, the upcoming presidential campaign could set the stage for an intra-party debate among Democrats on whether to take an even more hawkish approach on trade issues than the current administration; stay the current course; or return to a more centrist policy as was ultimately adopted by the Obama Administration while in office.

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) previously announced a process to obtain product exclusions from the additional tariffs in effect on certain products imported from China under the U.S. response to China’s unfair trade practices related to the forced transfer of U.S. technology and intellectual property. The 301 lists of products subject to tariffs was determined by a 90-day process that included public hearings and a notice and comment period. You can also find an unofficial spreadsheet with the final 301 lists here.

The USTR also provided an opportunity for the public to request the exclusion of a particular product from the additional duties in order to address situations that warranted excluding a particular product within a subheading, but not the tariff subheading as a whole.

All posted exclusion requests can be found on:

The USTR recently announced that it is still in the process of posting exclusion requests due to the high volume of submissions, and therefore there is currently a lag between the filing of an exclusion request and the posting of an exclusion request when public and confidential versions are been filed. The date of posting is the triggering date for initial comments regarding an exclusion requests.  Permissible comments include letters of support as well as opposition.  After the comment period is closed, an additional deadline will be established for rebuttal comments.

As of the date of this report, 815 exclusion requests have been denied.

None have been granted.

We hope you find this report helpful and please contact us if you have any questions.











Last updated on 10/30/2018: Added South Africa’s Section 232 steel and aluminum exemptions.

Unofficial spreadsheet with Final 301 list, partial list, and HTS’ removed added.

U.S. Trade Actions

Action Covered Products Rate Increase Effective Date
Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Steel – 25%
Aluminum – 10%
Status: Steel – all countries of origin except South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina (agreed to quotas); and Australia (exempted).

Aluminum – all countries of origin except Argentina (agreed to quota); and Australia (exempted).

Beginning August 13, steel articles covered by Section 232 from Turkey are subject to an ad valorem duty rate of 50%.

On October 24, South Africa was granted exemptions on 161 aluminum and 36 steel products by the Commerce Department.

Section 232 Autos and Automotive Parts TBD TBD
Status: For the latest status, please click here.
Section 301 For the final list of products in List 1, please click here.

For the final list of products in List 2, please click here.

For the final list of products in List 3, please click here.













Status: List 1 totaling $34 billion worth of imports is composed of 818 tariff lines, and went into effect on 7/6/2018.

List 2 totaling $16 billion worth of imports was originally composed of 284 proposed tariff lines identified by the interagency Section 301 Committee. 279 of the 284 lines went into effect on 8/23/2018.

For full details on List 2, please click here.

List 3 totaling approximately $200 billion of imports was originally composed of 6,031 tariff lines. 5,745 full and partial lines go into effect on 9/24/2018.

For full details on List 3, please click here.

Unofficial searchable and filterable spreadsheet with Current U.S. Section 301 Tariff Lists (Updated for Final List 3)

Retaliatory Actions


Canada For covered products, please click here. Table 1 – 25%
Table 2 – 10%
Table 3 – 10%
Status: The Canadian government received over 1,000 submissions of public feedback during public consultations on its original list.

Canada is imposing countermeasures against C$16.6 billion in imports of steel, aluminum, and other products from the U.S., representing the value of 2017 Canadian exports affected by the U.S. tariffs.

EU For covered products, please click here. Annex I – 10% or 25%
Annex II – 10% – 50%
Annex I – 6/22/2018
Annex II – 3/23/2018 or 5th day after WTO Dispute Settlement Body rules against the U.S. action, whichever is first.
Status: For the latest status, please click here.
Mexico For the translated list of covered products, please click here. 7% – 25% (pages 1-4)


10% – 15% (page 5)



Status: Most retaliatory measures effective as of 6/5/2018. An “exception” list is effective on 7/5/2018.
China (Response to Section 232 Tariffs) For covered products, please click here. Annex I – 15% – 25% 4/3/2018
Status: See above.
China (Response to Section 301 Tariffs) For covered products in List 1, please click here.

(Unofficial Version)

25% 7/6/2018
For covered products in List 2, please click here.(Unofficial Version) 25% 8/23/2018
For covered products in List 3 (announced August 3), please click here.(Unofficial Version) Annex 1 and 2 – now 10%

Annex 3 – now 5%

Annex 4 – remains 5%

(Originally 1-3 were 25, 20, and 10 percent, respectively)

Status: List 1 is composed of 545 tariff lines, and goes into effect on 7/6/2018.

List 2 contains 333 tariff lines on U.S. goods worth $16 billion. Start date is 8/23/2018.

List 3 contains 5,207 tariff lines on U.S. worth $60 billion. Start date is 9/24/2018.

India For covered products, please click here. Up to $10.6 billion;
Annex I – 5% – 100%
Status: The U.S. declined India’s request for WTO consultations. Thus leading to India’s retaliation tariffs on U.S. goods, effective immediately.
Japan For covered products, please click here. Up to $1.91 billion TBD – no earlier than March 23, 2021, or the 5th day following the date of a decision from the WTO DSB, whichever comes first.
Status: No update since May 18, 2018. Ambassador Lighthizer is holding trade talks with Economy Minister Motegi in July. Under Secretary McKinney is also leading a trade mission to Japan to discuss a possible bilateral trade deal.
Russia For covered products, please click here. Up to $3.16 billion TBD
Status: Russia will apply the proposed suspension of equivalent concessions upon the expiration of 30 days from the day on which Council on Trade in Goods has been notified. The suspension will continue until the U.S. lifts the safeguard measures.
Turkey For covered products, please click here. Up to $1.78 billion;
Annex I – 5% – 40%

Update on 10/15/2018: certain HTSUS subheadings covered by the supplemental action were modified as of October 1, 2018. This notice conforms the September 21 supplemental action to the HTSUS modifications in the Presidential Proclamation and amends the prior action taken in the investigation by removing certain subheadings of the HTSUS listed in Annex A to the September 21st Notice. 83 FR 49153.

Update on 8/22/2018: added the Government of Turkey’s WTO response to the U.S.’ doubling of tariffs on steel articles covered by Section 232 imported from Turkey.

Update on 8/16/2018: added link to Federal Register Notice formalizing China List 2 Section 301 tariffs.

Update on 8/14/2018: added new Section 232 tariff of 50% on steel from Turkey.

Update on 8/8/2018: added China’s retaliatory tariffs on $16 billion – List of affected HTS Subheadings includes additional 219 tariff items, plus tariff rate of 25%.

Update on 8/7/2017: added USTR’s final list of covered products for Section 301 List 2 tariffs with 25% tariff rate.

Update on 8/3/18: added China’s latest Section 301 (List 3) retaliatory tariffs.

Update on 8/2/2018: changed the proposed rate for China Section 301 List 3 from 10 percent to 25 percent.

Update on 7/13/2018: added link to an unofficial searchable and filterable spreadsheet listing the tariff codes for all three current U.S. Section 301 tariff lists (see last line in Section 301 Status).

Update on 7/11/2018: added new U.S. Section 301 tariffs announced on 7/10/2018.

Update on 7/2/2018: added EU Annex I tariffs effective.

Update on 6/29/2018: added Canadian retaliatory tariffs.

Update on 6/21/2018: added India, Japan, Russia, and Turkey.

Update on 6/18/2018: added China’s Section 301 retaliatory tariffs.

Update on 6/15/2018: added new U.S. Section 301 tariffs; added translated version of Mexican retaliatory measures and updated Mexico section.

Update on 9/18/2018: added the final list of products in List 3, its tariff rate of 10 percent, effective date of 9/24/2018, and tariff rate of 25 percent effective on 1/1/2019. Also, China’s retaliatory action for the new tariffs has been updated. The tariff rates changed for three of the four annexes. The new tariffs are effective on 9/24/2018.





































On September 17, 2018, the White House directed the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to implement 10 percent tariffs on nearly all the tariff lines in the original Section 301 List 3 valued at approximately $200 billion. Significantly, the notice does NOT indicate that there will be an exclusion process similar to Section 301 List 1 and 2.

The following day, the USTR issued a press release stating, “The [final] list contains 5,745 full or partial lines of the original 6,031 tariff lines that were on a proposed list of Chinese imports announced on July 10, 2018.”

On September 18, 2018, the USTR published the formal notice of this action in the Federal Register. 83 Fed Reg. 47,974.

For an unofficial downloadable spreadsheet providing affected HTS subheadings across all Section 301 actions, please click here. This includes:

  • Final List 1 ($34 billion);
  • Final List 2 ($16 billion);
  • Original List 3 ($200 billion);
  • Final List 3
    • Part 1 (5,745 lines);
    • Part 2 (11 Partial Lines listing 8-digit lines with their 10-digit exceptions); and
  • The 286 removed HTS codes.

The White House statement said the tariffs will rise to 25 percent on January 1, 2019.

On August 3, 2018, China threatened retaliatory tariffs on $60 billion worth of U.S. goods should President Trump move forward with any tariffs. This would result in a possible List 4.

Check here for the latest developments on all the on-going trade actions.

On September 18, 2018, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) published a notice in the Federal Register explaining the procedures and criteria related to requests for product exclusions from the additional tariffs placed on goods from China on August 23, 2018.


The USTR must receive requests to exclude a particular product by December 18, 2018. Responses to a request for exclusion of a particular product are due 14 days after the request is posted in the docket. Any replies to responses to an exclusion request are due the later of 7 days after the close of the 14 day response period, or 7 days after the posting of a response.

Per the notice, a docket will be opened on for the receipt of exclusion requests. The docket number is USTR–2018–0032. One product is allowed per request. Each request must identify a specific product and the 10-digit HTS. The product exclusion request must include the identity of the product, its physical characteristics and how to differentiate that product from others under the 8-digit HTSUS subheading. The USTR will not consider requests that identify the product using criteria that cannot be made public, or that identify the product by using the producer, importer, customer, chief use, trademark or trade name.

The USTR will periodically announce decisions on exclusion requests. If granted, the exclusion will be retroactively effective starting August 23, 2018 and extend for one year after the date on which the decision is published in the Federal Register.


On September 13, 2018, President Trump signed the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill (MTB) Act of 2018 (MTB), which temporarily reduces or eliminates import duties on specified raw materials and intermediate products used in manufacturing that are not produced or available domestically. It is intended to ensure that U.S. manufacturers are not at a disadvantage to their foreign competitors when sourcing manufacturing components.

The American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 (AMCA) directed the International Trade Commission (ITC) to establish a process for the submission and consideration of MTB petitions for duty suspensions and reductions. It required the ITC to submit preliminary and final reports on the petitions to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance (Committees). The ITC’s preliminary report was submitted on June 9, 2017 and the final report was submitted on August 8, 2017. On September 4, 2018, the House agreed to Senate amendments, moving the legislation to the president for signature. The current MTB petition cycle is now complete. The next MTB petition cycle, for 2021 through 2023, will begin not later that October 15, 2019.

The duty suspensions and reductions are effective for goods entered or withdrawn from a warehouse for consumption on or after October 13, 2018, which is 30 days after the date of the enactment.  The suspensions and reductions will last until December 31, 2020. All of the MTB provisions are in subchapter II to chapter 99 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). This language was added in a Federal Register Notice on August 16, 2018 (83 Fed Reg 40,823 at page 40,825). The notice also created a new U.S. Note 20(c) to Subchapter II of Chapter 99, HTSUS.

Of the 1,660 items are covered by the new law, roughly half are produced in China. Therefore, overlap between the MTB list and the Section 301 tariffs in effect, and those being considered exists. Goods originating in China are still subject to relevant Section 301 tariffs.  On August 21, 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a message stating, “Products of China that are covered by the Section 301 remedy and that are eligible for special tariff treatment…or that are eligible for temporary duty exemptions or reductions under subchapter II to chapter 99, shall be subject to the additional 25 percent ad valorem rate of duty imposed by headings 9903.88.01 and 9903.88.02.

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is holding public hearings from August 20 to August 24, 2018, and on August 27, 2018, regarding the proposed tariffs on approximately $200 billion worth of Chinese products.

Click here to view a schedule of witnesses. The public hearings are being held at the following times at the U.S. International Trade Commission in Washington, DC:

  • Monday, August 20, 2018 from 9:30 AM – 6:00 PM EDT
  • Tuesday, August 21, 2018 from 9:30 AM – 6:00 PM EDT
  • Wednesday, August 22, 2018 from 9:30 AM – 6:00 PM EDT
  • Thursday, August 23, 2018 from 9:30 AM – 6:00 PM EDT
  • Friday, August 24, 2018 from 9:30 AM – 6:00 PM EDT
  • Monday, August 27, 2018 from 9:30 AM – 4:00 PM EDT

According to a USTR press release, the proposed tariffs are in response to China’s unfair trade practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation, based on the findings in USTR’s investigation of China under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

Tariffs on $34 billion in goods from China are currently in effect, and tariffs on an additional $16 billion will take effect on August 23, 2018.

The Federal Register notice publishing the proposed tariff list and soliciting public comment can be viewed here.



NOTE – this post was updated on 9/19/2018 to reflect the change in retaliation duties on affected U.S. goods.

In a press release issued on August 1, United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer announced the President directed him to consider increasing the proposed level of the additional duty on the latest Section 301 List (List 3 worth $200 billion) from 10% to 25%.

On August 3, China responded in kind and threatened to increase retaliatory tariffs on $60 billion in U.S. goods should President Trump move forward with new tariffs on imports from China.

In addition to USTR’s proposed action on List 3, the second U.S. Section 301 List (worth $16 billion) just finished a public comment process. The White House has not announced its decision on List 2 as of yet. For an overview of the current U.S. Section 301 tariff status, please click here.

On 9/19/2018, China announced the rates would be 5 or 10%, instead of 5, 10, 20, or 25%.

Please click here for an unofficial version of the HTS Subheadings for Annex 1 (10% instead of 25%).

Please click here for an unofficial version of the HTS Subheadings for Annex 2 (10% instead of 20%).

Please click here for an unofficial version of the HTS Subheadings for Annex 3 ( 5% instead of 10%).

Please click here for an unofficial version of the HTS Subheadings for Annex 4 remain set at 5%.






On August 16, 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) published in the Federal Register the formal notice for the China Section 301 tariffs beginning on August 23.

The USTR published the final list of 279 Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheadings known collectively as ‘List 2’ on August 7, 2018. These tariff lines will see an additional ad valorem duty of 25% on products from China and is worth $16 billion.

Unlike the notice implementing List 1 from June 20, 2018, the USTR:

  • Added to Annex A of this notice clarifications on the application of the additional duties to goods entered under certain provisions of Chapter 98 and 99 of the HTSUS;
  • In Annex C to this notice, modifies the HTSUS note in Annex A to the June 20 notice in order to reflect these clarifications; and
  • Annex C makes a conforming amendment to the HTSUS heading in Annex A to the June 20 notice, and makes a technical correction to the HTSUS note in Annex A to the June 20 notice.

The tariff subheadings in Annex A and B are the same. The latter list includes unofficial descriptions of the types of products covered in each subheading.

Regarding product exclusions, the notice states, “…the Trade Representative has determined that USTR will establish a process by which U.S. stakeholders may request that particular products classified within an HTSUS subheading listed in Annex A be excluded from these additional duties. The process will be comparable to the exclusion process established in connection with the initial, $34 billion trade action. USTR will publish a separate notice describing the product exclusion process, including the procedures for submitting exclusion requests, and an opportunity for interested persons to submit oppositions to a request.”

Check here for the latest developments on all the on-going trade actions.


On August 8, China released its list of retaliatory tariffs on $16 billion in U.S. goods. This was in direct response to the USTR’s announcement on August 7 of the final List 2 of Section 301 tariffs on $16 billion in Chinese imports. The Chinese Ministry of Finance’s list released today includes an additional 219 tariff items that were added to the list China originally released back in June. Both the U.S. and China are setting tariff rates at 25% for this second tranche of goods and plan to implement the duties on August 23.

Please click here for an unofficial English version of the HTS Subheadings on the Chinese list.

For an overview of the current U.S. Section 301 tariff status, please click here.