On September 24th, 2025 US Customs and Border Protection issued a Withhold Release Order under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1307) against Giant Manufacturing Co LTD for any bicycles, parts or accessories manufactured in Taiwan based on reasonable indication of forced labor. CBP identified the presence of five of the ILO indicators of forced labor:

  • abuse of vulnerability,
  • abusive working and living conditions,
  • debt bondage,
  • withholding of wages and
  • excessive overtime.

Going forward, any shipment of the subject products manufactured by Giant Manufacturing’s Taiwan factories will be subject to immediate detention upon arrival into the United States. If a shipment is detained, under 19 CFR 12.43(a) the importer of record will have 3 months from the date of detention to provide adequate proof to CBP that the goods were not manufactured using forced labor. If the documentation sufficiently demonstrates that forced labor was not used then the goods will be released to the importer, otherwise the goods must be exported or destroyed pursuant to 19 CFR 12.44.

Giant Manufacturing has announced it plans on petitioning CBP to have the order revoked and reiterated the steps it proactively took to address possible forced labor concerns.

Global Trade Talks co-hosts Nicole Simonian and Dj Wolff welcome Karen Gerwitz, President of the World Trade Center Denver, as she provides insight to our listeners on how companies are managing and operating in this uncertain trade environment where they are often waiting for the next shoe to drop. Global Trade Talks is a podcast that shares brief perspectives on key global issues on international trade, current events, business, law, and public policy as they impact our lives.

Listen: Crowell.com | PodBean | SoundCloud | Apple Podcasts

The snapback of UN sanctions on Iran took effect on September 27, 2025, after the E3 (France, Germany, UK) triggered the mechanism under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and the Security Council failed to extend sanctions relief. Please see our previous Alert on the snapback process and what this could mean for global businesses.

The EU and UK have begun to re-impose on Iran their respective sanctions pre-dating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

  • EU Actions: On September 29, the EU announced the re-imposition of a broad array of restrictive measures on Iran:
    • Council Regulation 2025/1975: Amends Council Regulation 267/2012, restoring sectoral and trade sanctions, including:
      • bans on the supply to Iran of nuclear and ballistic missile-related items, gold, precious metals, diamonds, certain software, and key equipment for the energy sector;
      • prohibitions on the import, purchase and transport of crude oil, gas, petrochemical and petroleum products and related services;
      • transport restrictions, such as prohibitions on providing services to Iranian vessels/aircraft suspected of carrying prohibited goods; and
      • various banking and financial restrictions, including with respect to the transfer of funds to and from Iran and prohibitions on new Iranian banking relationships.

Certain prohibitions are subject to time-bound wind-down provisions for pre-existing contracts.

The EU’s sanctions measures mirror the scope of EU sanctions on Iran prior to the 2013 Joint Plan of Action (an interim agreement between Iran and the P5, plus Germany, pursuant to which the EU suspended certain measures before its more fulsome lifting of sanctions post-JCPOA), and notably go further than the UN sanctions alone, including restrictions on energy, transport, and finance.

  • UK Actions: In parallel,  the UK has:
    • Passed regulations to amend the UK’s Iran nuclear sanctions regime (which, post-Brexit, is autonomous from the EU) to reflect the reintroduction of UN sanctions.  In particular, the amending regulations:
      • re-introduce references to UNSC Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1929 (and the UK’s obligations under the same);
      • make technical amendments to ensure all lists of controlled items reflect UN Security Council control lists;
      • amend the asset freezing criteria to ensure there are grounds under UK law to designate UNSC sanctioned persons and entities; and
      • introduce an exemption enabling payments in respect of certain HMT sovereign debt products (in line with other sanctions regimes).
    • Updated its Sanctions List, adding 192 individuals and entities that are now subject to asset freezing sanctions.  These sanctioned individuals and entities include major Iranian banks, energy and petrochemical firms, government ministries, and companies linked to nuclear and missile proliferation.

The UK’s amendments to date are fairly contained since the UK (and EU) had maintained measures consistent with many of the UN sanctions on Iran. The UK has stated that it intends to bring in legislation to impose further sectoral measures, targeting “finance, energy, shipping, software, and other significant industries which are advancing Iranian nuclear escalation.”

On September 23, 2025, the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) issued an opinion vacating and remanding U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s forced labor Finding against Kingtom Aluminio S.R.L., a Dominican Republic-based aluminum extruder. The court found that CBP’s determination, which prohibited the entry of Kingtom’s aluminum extrusions under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, was arbitrary and capricious because it lacked a satisfactory explanation and did not provide a rational connection between the facts found and the agency’s decision. The public administrative record and Federal Register notice contained only conclusory statements and failed to cite specific evidence or describe the circumstances of the investigation, distinguishing this case from prior decisions where agencies provided at least a minimal factual basis.

Judge Timothy M. Reif emphasized that administrative agencies must articulate clear and reasoned grounds for enforcement actions, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act. In this case, the court determined that neither the heavily redacted administrative record nor CBP’s published finding met the legal standard for adequate explanation. As a result, the court vacated the forced labor finding against Kingtom and remanded the matter to CBP for further explanation or reconsideration. CBP is required to file a remand redetermination within 90 days, after which the parties will have an opportunity to comment.

Notably, this was the first time CBP issued a direct finding without escalating the enforcement action from a Withhold Release Order (WRO). The difference between a WRO and a Finding is that for a Finding, there is conclusive evidence that the goods are made with forced labor. In this action, the Finding was issued without giving the company an opportunity to respond or provide evidence to the contrary.

The lack of an explanation here and the CIT’s requirement that reasoning be provided moving forward means that CBP will be required to explain Findings in the future, which will offer importers an even clearer blueprint of the risk signals and indicators to which CBP pays attention when investigating and assessing a party.

Crowell continues to monitor developments in the Forced Labor space and their impact on industry.

On August 28, France, Germany, and the UK (the E3) initiated a “snapback” process that will reimpose UN sanctions on Iran on September 27 unless the Security Council acts. On September 19, a resolution to extend sanctions relief failed to receive sufficient votes at the Security Council and was not adopted. If snapback occurs, previously imposed UN sanctions on Iran will be reinstated. This includes an arms embargo on Iran, a ban on supplying nuclear-related technologies and materials, and an asset freeze on designated individuals and entities.

Click here to continue reading the full version of this alert.

On August 27, 2025, the Department of State published a final rule amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) and updating the U.S. Munitions List (“USML”). The rule, effective September 15, 2025, implements changes following public comment and periodic review required under the Arms Export Control Act.

The latest ITAR amendments remove certain items from control, including lead-free birdshot ammunition and GNSS anti-jam/anti-spoofing systems, based on assessments that these no longer provide a critical military or intelligence advantage. At the same time, new controls have been added for advanced aircraft parts and large unmanned underwater vehicles (“UUVs”) with specific military features, reflecting ongoing technology developments and national security priorities. The Department also clarified definitions for terms such as “foreign advanced military aircraft” and “mission systems,” and added the F-47 fighter to the USML. These revisions respond directly to industry feedback and public comments, with refinements to controls for aircraft radar, IEDs, body armor, antennas, and other entries.

A significant feature of the rule is a new exemption in ITAR §126.9(u), which allows for the temporary export, reexport, and import of certain large UUVs (under 8,000 lbs.) for scientific research, civil infrastructure, or search and rescue purposes, provided there is no transfer of registration, control, or ownership to a foreign person. This exemption is intended to facilitate legitimate civilian and research uses of advanced underwater technology while maintaining strict controls against diversion to military applications.

For items removed from the USML, exporters must now review jurisdiction and licensing procedures under the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”). Existing DDTC licenses for transitioning items will remain valid for up to three years to allow industry time to adjust to the new regulatory environment.

These targeted revisions are part of the Department’s ongoing effort to keep ITAR focused on items that provide a critical military or intelligence advantage and to ensure the USML reflects technological and commercial realities. Exporters, manufacturers, and research institutions should review the revised USML and ITAR provisions to ensure compliance.

Crowell will continue to monitor developments in U.S. export controls and their impact on industry.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced via Federal Register Notice the opening of the window to submit requests to include additional derivative products under the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs. The window opened on September 15, 2025 and is set to close on September 29, 2025, at 11:59 PM (EST). Requests are required to include information regarding the derivative product and tariff classification for any inclusion request and are to be submitted to the Defense Industrial Base Programs inbox at DIBPrograms@bis.doc.gov.

After the elapse of the inclusion request window, BIS will post the comments in a docket on regulations.gov for opposition or support comments on the requested inclusion. The period for opposition or support comments is set to last two weeks. Following the two-week window for opposition or support comments, BIS will review and consider the submission over a sixty-day period. If the inclusion requests are granted, BIS will announce the approved inclusion via Federal Register Notice and will post a decision memo on the regulations.gov docket.

The September inclusion request window is the second inclusion request period held since the process was first announced on March 5, 2025. The first inclusion request window began in May and ended in August, resulting in BIS including over four-hundred additional products to the steel and aluminum derivative tariffs, announced via Federal Register Notice. Only sixty HTS codes requested by interested parties were denied inclusion.  Denials were typically limited only to products already subject to section 232 tariffs under a separate designation (e.g., BIS declined to add products already listed under the auto parts 232 tariffs to the steel 232 tariff list. 

Parties wishing to challenge the legal sufficiency of the inclusion process, or the basis for inclusion of a downstream manufactured product in the “steel derivatives” list must take steps to present arguments in opposition during the comment window period, or risk losing the opportunity to mount a court challenge to the tariffs for failing to first exhaust administrative remedies. 

On September 12, 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a final rule that announced the addition of 32 new entities to the Entity List (see BIS final rule here). 23 entities were added under the destination of China, one under India, one under Iran, one under Singapore, one under Taiwan, three under Turkey, and two under the UAE. The newly added entities include Chinese chipmakers and biotechnology companies, Turkish firms that diverted U.S. origin goods on the Common High Priority List (CHPL) to Russia, and an UAE trading company that diverted non-EAR99 items to Iran and Russia.

All exports to these entities of items subject to the EAR now require a license, and BIS will review these license applications under either a presumption or policy of denial.

The reasons that BIS cited for the addition of the new entities include:

  • Their contribution to China’s quantum technology capabilities and military modernization efforts;
  • Acquisition of U.S. origin-items for diversion to parties on the Entity List (specifically, for diversion to major Chinese chipmaker SMIC);
  • Export of U.S.-origin CHPL electronics to Russia and contribution to procurement networks for Russia’s defense industry and intelligence services;
  • Supplying of technology to Russian military end users;
  • Diversion of U.S. origin items to Russia without prior authorization from BIS;
  • Facilitation of transshipment to Russia and Iran;
  • Export or attempted export of items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) from the U.S. to Russia and Iran;
  • Diversion of dual-use items in support of the Iranian military;
  • Evasion of BIS end-use checks (EUCs).

It is notable that BIS added certain entities solely for their efforts to export CHPL items to Russia because: (i) it is the first instance of the Trump Administration designating entities on the Entity List for Russia-related activity; and (ii) the citation to the CHPL is a reference that the Trump Administration is still relying on mechanisms created during the Biden Administration that other G7 countries are relying upon as well.

The final rule also revises an entry by removing two addresses from one entity under the destination of Russia, and modifies 27 existing entities on the Entity List to correct for typographical errors.

The final rule is effective September 12, 2025.

In today’s environment of increased protectionism combined with the Department of Justice’s identification of trade fraud as an enforcement priority, U.S. importers must understand the growing risks associated with the False Claims Act (FCA). This webinar will cover the FCA and the government’s investigative tools, enforcement trends and case developments, and steps that companies can take to mitigate risks.

Speakers

• Jason Crawford, Partner, Washington, D.C.
• Brian Tully McLaughlin, Partner, Washington, D.C.
• Preston Pugh, Partner, Washington, D.C.
• Maria Vanikiotis, Counsel, New York
• Riley Delfeld, Associate, Washington, D.C.
• Katherine Quinn, Associate, Washington, D.C.
• Will Tucker, Associate, Washington, D.C.

Questions

For questions about this webinar, please contact Liam Householder.

Registration

To register for this event, click here.

Modifications to Scope

On Friday, September 5th, 2025, President Trump announced via Executive Order a large number of modifications to the scope of the reciprocal tariffs, which were initially announced on April 2, 2025, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The Executive Order released on September 5th modified the scope of the tariffs by amending Annex II to cover additional products under exclusion, as well as remove some products from exclusion. The newly-added products that are excluded from reciprocal tariffs effective September 8th, 2025, include certain critical minerals and pharmaceutical products that are currently under Section 232 investigation, as well as precious metals such as gold and silver. Products that have been removed from Annex II and are now subject to reciprocal tariffs effective September 8th, 2025, include certain aluminum hydroxide, resin, and silicone products.

Previously, the reciprocal tariffs applied to nearly all imports, apart from certain products such as:

  • Articles subject to 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b), which covers various forms of communication not involving any transfer of value, donations, informational materials, or transactions generally occurring with respect to travel to or from any country;
  • Articles potentially subject to other tariff authorities, such as products subject to certain Section 232 investigations or tariffs; and
  • Articles listed in Annex II of the Executive Order 14257.

Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners (PTAAP)

Further, the September 5th, 2025, Executive Order created a framework to guide both future and existing trade deals. The Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners (PTAAP) Annex lays out which products the President may be willing to reduce reciprocal tariffs on by applying only the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff in the event of a concluded future deal with a trading partner. In determining which products apply for a tariff reduction, the President and other senior officials, such as the Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, will consider the extent of a trading partner’s commitments to addressing United States trade concerns when implementing a deal. The products included in the PTAAP Annex cover the following categories:

  • Certain aircraft and aircraft parts;
  • Certain generic pharmaceuticals and their ingredients;
  • Unavailable natural resourced and closely related derivative products; and
  • Certain agricultural products not grown or produced in sufficient quantity in the United States to meet domestic demand.

The PTAAP Annex and framework closely resembles the United States-Japan deal, which was signed into effect on September 4th, 2025 via Executive Order. This agreement was first announced on July 22, 2025, and allowed U.S. importers to pay 15% reciprocal tariffs on Japanese products, while Japan was required to invest $550 billion dollars into the U.S. This tariff rate of 15% included automobiles and automobile parts, marking Japan as the first nation to achieve reduction of tariffs on automobiles and automobile parts without volume restrictions, which was a significant feat in light of the levies on this sector as a result of a Section 232 investigation culminating in a 25% duty rate.

The inclusion of the PTAAP framework in the Executive Order represents a carrot for trade partners in the context of the tariff sticks, offering those countries negotiating trade deals a framework that is less daunting than the current tariff landscape. The efficacy and the applicability of the newest Executive Orders on reciprocal tariffs remains to be seen as the appeal of the IEEPA tariffs is considered by the Supreme Court.